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A brief account is given of differentiation theory as it relates
to form discrimination studies, and relevant experimental work is
reviewed. Some preliminary comments on the concept of similarity,
arising out of this and pertaining to the extent to which children can
be said to possess an adequate grasp of what is implied by "the same
as," are made as an introduction to the first experiment. This
examines the performance of a group of children twice, at mean ages
3-8 and 4-9, in matching-from-sample discrimination tasks with
stimulus material varying in orientation only, and in form and orient¬
ation. Considerable improvement in terms of increased number of
correct responses is shown. A sequence of three stages is described.
In the first, characterised by a small number of correct responses and a
small number of multiple responses (MR), that is responses where more
than one comparison figure are matched to the standard, performance is
affected as much by extraneous factors such as position of a figure in the
comparison array as by stimulus features. The second stage shows an
increase in both MR and number of correct matches; here global features
of similarity appear to be being detected and used. The final stage,
with most responses being correct and few MRs being given, represents
the most competent level. It is indicated that failure to detect stimulus
features, rather than the presence of a deviant notion of the meaning of
"same, "/
ii.
"same," is responsible for the error patterns shown.
The concept of similarity is then examined in greater detail.
A number of distinctions are drawn, in particular, between the
specification of similarity relations between members of a stimulus
set in terms of its attribute structure and the perceived similarity of
the same set as expressed by subjects' judgements. The importance
of providing a normative model as a baseline for the assessment of
perfomnance is emphasised. A number of ways of specifying stimuli
are described, together with methods of analysing similarities data.
The use of a model to link perceived and physical structure, and thus
to give some indication of the processes underlying discrimination
performance, is considered. A set of experiments is then described
which embody these ideas, and it is shown that even in four-year-old
children errors in a matching-from-sample task systematically reflect
features of the v/hole stimulus set. It is also shown that this does not hold
with pair comparison presentation. The capacity of children for
redefining the attribute structure of stimulus sets is brought out. It is
concluded that much more attention should be given to stimulus speci¬
fication in forma! terms if the processes involved in form discrimination
are to be elucidated, as opposed to the discriminability of a particular
set of stimuli under particular circumstances.
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is organised around two major issues. The first
concerns the experimentally-defined ability of children around the age
of five to discriminate visually between two-dimensional forms varying
in several attributes/ and between forms varying only in the orientation
in which they are presented. A learning paradigm has not been used, as
the context in which this work was developed emphasised the study of the
use by the child of the cognitive apparatus already available to him in
extracting and processing stimulus information rather than the modification
of responses over time following differential reinforcement. The major
portion of the results to be reported consists of the confusion errors made
in a matching-to-sample task and their distribution over both groups and
individuals, in an attempt to provide at least some counterweight to the
stricture that "psychology has not gone far enough in investigating the
growth of ability to detect regularity, order and structure." (E.J. Gibson,
1969). The second issue is centred on the formal aspects involved in this
kind of experiment; how best are the relations among the elements of the
stimulus set to be defined in terms of their physical parameters, to what
extent is the structure of the stimulus set reflected in the error patterns
obtained and how is this to be assessed, and what sort of consideration
should be reflected in the approach taken to each of these problems. To
the extend that the second issue can be dealt with adequately, we should
be able by bringing both lines together to make some general and principled
statements about the child's perceptual functioning.
it/
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It may be as well to point out that "perceptual" here is being
used in the sense made explicit by Ima? and Gamer (1968), where they
refer to the use of "... the direct perceptual properties of the stimuli ..."
Examples of such properties are size, number of angles, or colour. They
are contrasted with derived or learned properties such as those which would
define certain geometrical forms as letters of the alphabet. Thus in
talking of perceptual functioning we are concerned with the use made of
immediately available aspects of the stimuli in matching them to each
other.
The order of presentation of these topics is chronological rather than
systematic, In that the formal issues are tested fully only in the second
series of experiments to be described. The first two chapters, dealing with
the earlier work, contain an account of the theoretical position adopted as
a frame of reference in posing the initial questions, a brief review of the
relevant literature, and an account of the initial experimental work. This
was carried out as part of a much larger-scale study of the development of
cognitive and linguistic skills in pre-school children. It was a collaborative
venture as far as the initial choice of material was concerned, but the collection and
analysis of results, and the implications drawn from them are the responsibility
of the present author. The findings have already been published (Taylor
and Wales, 1970) and the paper is included here as an appendix. There
seems no point in giving basic data twice over, and therefore a condensed




Formal issues are introduced in Chapter 3. These include a
discussion of different approaches to stimulus specification, the use of
non-metric multidimensional scaling methods in the analysis of
similarities data, the nature and inter-relation of physical and psycho¬
logical similarity, and the question of whether the study of individual
or group results is more appropriate. A number of cross sectional studies,
us opposed to the longitudinal one of chapter two, are then described,
which are intended to illuminate the foregoing theoretical questions.
In addition, the essentially non-random nature of the subjects' responses
and the influence of the context provided by the total available stimulus
set are brought out. Finally, and inevitably, the implications of the





Since "perception", in any theoretical or empirical context,
refers to the interaction of an individual with features of his environ¬
ment registered via the various sensory modalities, it is strange that an
account of the topic firmly based on the closely and convincingly argued
premise that structured, non-random and consistent information is
available from the physical world about the objects and events which go
to make it up did not appear prior to 1966 (J.J. Gibson, 1966). In his
theory of information pick-up, it is assumed that the invariants of stimulus
structure are registered by a perceptual system, rather than constructed by
it. The developmental implications of this thesis have been elaborated
by E. J. Gibson (1969). Regressive differentiation of features of stimu¬
lation, taken as "... increased specificity of correspondence between
stimulus information provided by the environment and the organism's
perception of it ..." is seen to be the modification which occurs in the
course of development and learning. This theoretical approach is contrasted
with what are described as enrichment theories; the common factor in
these is their emphasis on some addition to sensory input in accounting for
changes in perception. On the Gibsons' view the criterion for learning is
increased specificity, in the sense that properties and structural features of
stimulation which were not previously detected come to be responded to.
Objects are differentiated in terms of the distinctive features which define
the/
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the unique characteristics of each in terms of its relation to other objects; a
close analogy is drawn between this notion and the distinctive features of
phonemes as described by Jakobson and Halle, whereby speech sounds are
characterised uniquely in terms of the features which they do not share with
the other members of the set. There is a clear emphasis on the relational
nature of distinctive features; they are only relevant in a particular context.
The processes underlying the refinement of differentiation are taken to be
abstraction, of those aspects of stimulus information most apt for the task in
hand; filtering, apparent in the increasing ability to ignore irrelevant stimulus,
attributes; and attention, the orienting of receptor surfaces towards stimulus
objects. The general prediction based on this set of ideas with which we shall be
concerned here is that the fewer features there are differentiating between the
members of a stimulus set, the greater will be the number of confusions
between them.
The attraction of a theoretical basis which emphasises active search for
and extraction of relevant stimulus information should be obvious for a study
where considerations of prior knowledge of the task, the acquisition of appropriate
learning sets, the presence of dimensional transfer or the nature of mediating
responses are irrelevant. At the same time it should be noted that relatively
little is said about the processes to which the information is subject once it has
been extracted; here perhaps E.J. Gibson swings too far away from the schema
theorists, exemplified in her eyes by Bartlett, Vernon, Piaget and Bruner, who
concentrate on the cognitive, inferential aspects of perception without much
consideration/
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consideration of what activates the schema. However, it is possible to make
more specific predictions on the basis of differentiation theory, and to that
extent it can be considered to be a more useful basis for investigation; and
although it emphasises the detection of stimulus information, the use to
which this is put is not entirely overlooked.
With this brief exposition of the framework within which the results to
be reported here are to be evaluated, it remains to review the experimental
findings which influenced the design of the first study and to present a
preliminary discussion of the concept of similarity as it enters into work of
this nature. No claims for completeness are made, for either of these topics;
the material quoted has been chosen simply to exemplify points of major
relevance. Thus the literature on discrimination learning has been virtually
ignored except where it meets this criterion.
Most of the work that has been done on form discrimination in young children
has been concerned more with their ability to differentiate between identical
forms in varying orientations than between distinct forms. Definite and
consistent orientation preferences for simple geometric figures in four- to
five-year-old children were shown by Ghent (1961), and Ghent and Bernstein
(1961) demonstrated that this affected accuracy of response in a matching task.
The figures in the former situation judged by the younger children to be "right
way up" all had their "focal point", that part of the figure which catches the
attention most readily, such as the point of a vee, at the top. This fact was
interpreted in terms of a directional scanning hypothesis, whereby younger
children/
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children are held to fixate the focal point and scan downwards from there,
whereas older children start scanning from the top, regardless of the position
of the focal point. Braine (1965) (as Ghent had by this time become) tested
this notion using geometric figures with focal points at one end and distinguishing
features at the other. Her prediction, duly confirmed, was that younger
children (mean age three years six months) would show improved matching
to sample from a four-choice array with figures with the focal point at the
top, and that older children (mean age four years nine months) would perform
better with the distinguishing feature at the top. A third group of subjects,
mean age four years two months, showed no comparable difference.
Ghent's version of the scanning hypothesis is contradicted by the findings
of Kerpelman and Pollack (1964). Using irregular pentagons in a matching-
from-sample task they concluded that differences in the bottoms of the forms
provided most information for discrimination with four and five year old children.
It is unfortunate that neither of these investigations included some record of
eye movements; the work of Russian investigators (Zaporozhets, 1964) has
shown that systematic scanning of the outlines of even simple forms does not
appear before the age of five. Without a record of eye movements the scanning
hypothesis must remain not proven.
The scope of enquiry is extended beyond this seeming cul-de-sac by a
study by Wohlwill and Wienner (1966). They used figures differing in presence
or absence of internal detail, being open or closed, and of high or low direction¬
ality, in a two choice matching task with orientation only being varied, with
subjects of mean age four years two months. Left-right reversals (i.e. b-d)
produced/
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produced significantly more errors than up-down reversals (i.e. b — p) although
mean error scores were rather low (5.4 out of a possible 32 per S). Response
latencies were higher for the low-directionality figures than for the high, which
suggests that problems involving the former require a greater degree of effort,
in some sense, for their solution.
Working with somewhat older children (first and third grade, American)
Rosenblith (1965) found that in a one-choice matching situation, the one
comparison figure being changed until a match to the standard was reported,
up-down reversal resulted in fewer confusions than left-right reversals. The
figures used were right isosceles triangles and circles with 20° gaps in the
circumference. Sekuler and Rosenblith (1964) showed that type of error in
this same discrimination task is affected by the relative position of the stimulus
figures; no errors are made in discriminating between pairs with the hypotenuse
horizontal when they are presented side by side, but confusions do occur when
the hypotenuse is vertical or oblique. Presentation of these figures one above
the other produces the opposite error pattern. Similar results were obtained with
the incomplete circles.
A discrimination learning study of some interest was carried out by
Rudel and Teuber (1963) using a two-choice training situation with groups ranging
from three years six months to eight years five months in mean age. Only one
member of the youngest group failed to reach criterion with a vertical vs.
horizontal line problem, and with problem 1 C, Fig. 1. Only three members of
the two youngest groups succeeded in a left-right reversal problem (1 A, Fig. 1);
and only one subject from these groups reached criterion in discriminating 45°
oblique lines. Performance on all problems improved with age, but there were
noticeable/
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noticeable differences between the mean number of trials necessary to achieve
success on the first two and last two problems described above at all age levels.
This paper provoked two studies directed against the authors' argument
to the effect that because the human four-year-old performs only at the same
level as an octopus in orientation discrimination, some part of the visual
system of the brain must still not have reached full development by this age.
Jeffrey (1966) by using a phased training procedure directed at the discrimination
of oblique lines, found that half of his experimental group became able to
differentiate between them, whereas none of his control group did. Mean age
here was four years five months. Failure in discrimination cannot therefore
be attributed solely to neurological deficit. Over and Over (1967) make the
same point in a study comparing discrimination learning and matching procedures.
With the former, results comparable to those of Rude! and Teuber were obtained;
children of mean age four years one month had little difficulty with the vertical/
horizontal line discrimination, but were much less successful with obliques.
Similar results were found on the former problem using a two-choice matching
technique, but performance with obliques was markedly improved. Presentation of
the standard either above or beside the comparison figures did not affect the
results. A second experiment with comparison figures exposed at varying intervals
following presentation and removal of the standard led to the suggestion that poor
memory for orientation differences is responsible for the worse performance found
in discrimination learning tasks (cf. also Bryant, 1969).
Further evidence on the influence of stimulus alignment is provided in
this context by Huttenlocher (1967). She repeated part of the Rudel and Teuber
experiment,/
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experiment, presenting up-down and left-right reversed figures one above the
other as well as side by side. Two groups of five year olds were tested on the
four sets of figures shown in 1 and 11, Fig. 1. All subjects solved the up-
down problems in 1, and the left-right problems in 11; seven out of sixteen
solved the left-right problems in 1, and thirteen out of sixteen the up-down
problems in 11. Significantly more trials were required for A and B than for
C and D in 1. Thus the relative position of such figures is shov/n to have a
considerable influence on the results, but even taking this into account discrimination
of left-right reversals is more difficult than of comparable up-down ones.
Sekuler and Houlihan (1968) report a similar finding with adult subjects, the
measure here being time to respond "same" or "different" correctly to pairs
of tachistoscopically exposed figures.
The ability to discriminate between different forms appears to develop
in advance of that required for discrimination of orientation differences alone.
Birch and Lefford (1967) found the mean correct score on the discrimination sub¬
test of the 1937 edition of the Stanford-Binet to be 10.9 out of a possible 12
with five year old subjects, the most common error being failure to distinguish
between upright and inverted triangles. Rosenbiith (1965) points out that she
used an orientation rather than a form discrimination task because of the failure
of subjects in the age range of interest to make errors on the latter. Using random
polygons of four, eight, twelve and sixteen sides in a series of 80 three-choice
oddity problems, Brown and Goldstein (1967) found very few errors made by
five year old children. One must admire the stamina of both the experimenter
and the subjects here, as each session lasted some two hours. Response latency
was used as a measure; a curvilinear relationship was found between this and
number/
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number of sides, with time to respond being shortest with eight-sided figures.
It is suggested that this relation represents an interaction between the
discriminability and the information content of the stimulus figures; simpler
figures, being less free to vary than more complex ones, will be more difficult
to discriminate. With increasing complexity discrimination becomes easier
as figures become more variable until, beyond some optimal level represented
here by eight-sided figures, more information than can be immediately processed
is available. The hypothesis is a reasonable post hoc account of their findings,
but the experiment adds relatively little to our knowledge of children's
discriminative abilities.
The studies reviewed so far have been on a relatively small scale, with
the possible exception of the last-mentioned, restricted in terms of both type of
stimulus materia! and the number of comparison figures available to the subject.
Particularly in the light of Garner's (1966} emphasis on the importance of the
properties of entire stimulus sets in determining responses to problems involving
only one member of the set, this raises the question of the extent to which the
phenomena discovered can be taken as fully representative of discrimination
performance. Two large-scale studies by E. J. Gibson and her colleagues do
much to redress the balance (Gibson,E., Gibson, J., Pick and Osser, 1962:
Gibson, E., Osser, Schiff, and Smith, 1964). The former involved a matching-
to-sample test, with a comparison array of thirteen figures, carried out with
subjects between four and nine years of age. It was devised as part of an
investigation of reading skills. The standard figures were letter-like forms, and
the twelve non-identical members of the comparison set represented systematic
transformations/
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transformations of the standard; the point of the experiment was "... to
trace the development of letter differentiation as it is related to those features
which are critical for the task ..." (E. Gibson, 1965). Of the twelve
transformation types used, five altered the shape of the standard forms; three
of these involved line-to-curve changes, or vice versa, with one, two or three
lines being varied, and two were described as topological, either introducing
a break in a closed standard or closing a gap already present in it. There were
three rotation transformations and two reversal; with symmetrical figures the
effects of the latter would be identical to those of certain rotations. The list
was completed by two perspective changes, slant left and slant back, which
produced minimal differences between the standard and the transformed figure.
Subjects were instructed to pick from the array those figures which were "exactly
like" the standard. Topological transformations presented little difficulty, even
to the youngest subjects; confusions with perspective transformations, however,
were numerous for all groups and showed little tendency to decline as age
increased. Line to curve and rotation and reversal transformation produced error
scores between these two extremes in the youngest group, but they declined
sharply with age. In the first set at all ages scores reflected the number of lines
altered, with changes in only one representing the greatest level of difficulty.
A similar rate of decrease was found for rotations and reversals; 45° and 180°
rotations were more likely to result in errors than 90° rotations, while the two




This experiment was replicated, on the same group of five year
old subjects, with letters of the alphabet as standards and the same transformations
applied to them. Confusion errors correlated 0.86 over the rwo situations.
The authors suggested, on the basis of their findings, that the influence of
transformation is more important in predicting discrimination performance than are
the characteristics of the standard. Improvement in discrimination with age
canes from the learning of "... features or dimensions of difference which
are criteria I for differentiating letters." (Gibson et al 1962, p. 904); hence
the relative failure to detect the non-criterial perspective changes, and the
success with topological transformations. Thus break and close in figure
outlines can be understood to act as distinctive features for all age-groups in
this study; line to curve and rotation or reversal transformations are initially
used much less as such, but become more salient as the child grows older and
the probability of detecting the differences marked by them increases; and
perspective transformations by and large have no differentiating value.
The importance of transformation type in predicting discrimination
performance is demonstrated in an experiment by Pick (1965). She contrasted
two hypotheses relating to the learning of discrimination; one that improvement
depends on learning how the forms differ, the other that learning a schematic
prototype of the standard is necessary. Using part of the stimulus material
designed by Gibson et al (1962), she first taught kindergarten children to
differentiate between the standards and their transformations. Three transfer
tasks were used. In the first, corresponding to the first hypothesis, the subjects
were tested on ability to discriminate between different standard forms from
those/
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those used in the training period and their transformations, which were the
same as those to which they had already been exposed. The second transfer
group were tested with the same standards but different transformations, and
the third, control group were given different standards and different trans¬
formations. This was the order of success in the transfer test; both experi¬
mental groups showed significantly better discrimination than the control
group, but the one tested with the same transformations was significantly
better than the other. Thus the superiority of emphasising distinctive features
rather than working from a template of the standard figure is demonstrated.
The second major study by Gibson and her colleagues (Gibson et a!,
1964) was a direct attempt to discover what the distinctive features of letters
are: "What dimensions of difference must a child learn to discriminate for each
ietter to become unique?" (Gibson et al, 1964, p.2). The method used
represents an attempt to extend Jakobsan and Hailed analysis of phonemic
distinctive features to graphemes, or pictorial symbols. In the original, each
phoneme is defined uniquely in terms of its feature pattern, that is by the
presence or absence of each feature; to remain distinct over a wide range of
speakers, etc. the features must be invariant under certain transformations and
so have to be essentially relational. Two such feature lists were drawn up for
this study, each of which provided unique descriptions for each of the letters of
the alphabet. These were tested against the confusion errors made by four
year old children in a matching-to-sample task with letters. The first experiment
produced too few errors for comparison with feature list predictions to be possible.
The/
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The second used both errors and response latencies with two sets of letter
stimuli, of high and low confusability as defined by the feature lists. Under
these conditions it was found that both errors and latencies were significantly
higher for the high-confusion material. An admittedly crude comparison
between number of confusions and feature differences produced a greater-than-
chance number of significant correlations, thus supporting the notion of using
a feature list in such a context. A multidimensional scaling analysis was
carried out on the confusion matrix. This yielded three dimensions, straight
vs. curve, relative obliqueness, and one which "... might conceivably be
thought of as complexity. " (Gibson etai, 1964, p. 18). In addition open
and closed letters were clearly separated in the final configuration.
There are relatively few firm conclusions which can be drawn from
these studies. Ghent's work shows that orientation preferences exist and that
they can affect performance in a matching task; her directional scanning
hypothesis, however, is directly contradicted by Kerpelman and Pollack's
findings. In spite of the amount of work done, it seems that this particular
case presents a blind alley. The degree to which direction is marked appears
to affect time taken to make a discrimination, as indicated by Wohlwill and
Wiener's demonstration that response Ictencies are higher for low - than for
high-directionality figures. They also show that left-right reversals are more
likely to produce confusions than are up-down, as does Rosenblith. With two-
choice arrays this error pattern may be reversed, however, with appropriate
modification of the lay-out of the stimulus array. Discrimination between pairs
of/
of oblique lines is well-nigh impossible for children under five in a learning
task without some form of pre-training, or unless a matching situation is
used. The results obtained by Gibson et al (1962), which failed to show any
difference in difficulty between left-right and up-down reversals, are in
contrast to the conclusion that the former provide a more difficult task.
This apparent contradiction has been resolved by a reanalysis of the relevant
parts of the data by Rosenblith (1965). She points out that only a few of the
standard figures used allowed both types of transformation to result in
differences from the standard, the remainder being symmetric around either
the horizontal or the vertical axis, and that on these there were more confusions
with the left-right transformation. Where rotation alone is concerned, 45°
and 180° transformations are more confusing than 90°. Little can be said about
shape discrimination, beyond the fact that it develops more rapidly than the
ability to discriminate orientation. Features which are likely to be of use in
this situation are open vs. closed, straight vs. curved, and presence vs. absence
of oblique segments.
Turning to the question of similarity, there are two guises ?n which
it is raised in this context. One concerns the theoretical and methodological
issues involved in studying the concept of similarity as such and the way in which
it is used in a given situation. Discussion of these problems is deferred until
the results of the first experiment have been presented. The other is related
to the practical question of how well children around five years of age understand
and use the relation expressed in such terms as "the same as" or "just like",
which/
which are of necessity used in the instructions in matching studies of the
type just reviewed. Even for adults the notion of similarity is not unequivocal;
indeed, Shepherd (1964) points out that a common response to the request
to indicate which of several stimuli varying in more than one attribute is
most similar to a standard stimulus is "Similar with respect to what? " There
is evidence (Griffiths, Shantz, and Sigel, 1967) that five year old children
do not use "same" correctly, and that this causes more difficulty than other
relational terms such as "more" and "less". It is therefore extremely
important to have as clear and unambiguous an indication as possible of the
adequacy of children's ability to handle the notion of similarity if deductions
about their perceptual abilities are going to be made on the basis of data
gathered in situations involving the application of "same".
There are two ways in which errors might arise from the child's use
of similarity in such a task. The "meaning of the word" may not be correctly
understood, inasmuch as its reference to at least partial identity between two
(or more) objects may not be appreciated. If this is so, then one would expect
reaponses to be essentially random, or to be based on some such (experimentally)
irrelevant factor as position in the array. In the other case the word "same"
would be understood in its relational aspects, but its application might deviate
from adult criteria. Here systematic error patterns would be expected, although
different in structure frcm that which an adult might produce with comparable
material. Such an independent assessment is available for the subjects of
Experiment 1. They were also tested, roughly simultaneously with the
discrimination/
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discrimination task, in a classification task as part of which they were
required to indicate ob|ecfs which were "the same in some way" as one
presented by the experimenter. Two types of material were used, common
objects (e.g. toothbrush, egg-cup) and geometrical shapes. Two sets of
each type were used, in one there were four kinds of objects and four
colours, with the attributes of shape and colour being correlated; that is,
all squares were red, all circles blue, etc. In the other the attributes were
orthogonal, that is, there were three examples of each shape, each of a
different colour. The experiment is described by Campbell and Young
(1968); its linguistic aspects are examined by Donaldson and Wales (1968).
It is quite clear from the results that, with two exceptions, the children
were able to make appropriate choices on the basis of these instructions.
Thus we can state that any errors in the discrimination task are not due to
lack of comprehension of its relational aspects, although the question of
deviation from acceptable adult standards still remains and will be taken up
in the light of the results. The two exceptions will also be discussed in
the context of their discrimination performance.
Chapter 2
Experiment 1
A developmental study of form discrimination in pre-school children
The object of this study was to examine changes over time in pre¬
school children's ability to discriminate visually-presented material
differing in both shape and orientation and in orientation alone. The focus
of interest is in the use made at different ages of such differentiating
attributes of the stimulus materiel as are available, whether there is any
systematic basis to the types of confusions made, and the extent to which
response patterns can provide information^ on the interaction between the
child's use of similarity relations and his observed perceptual functioning.
At this stage experimental strategy was Baconian rather than strictly hypo-
thetico-deductive; previous studies have been used to provide a basis for
informal examination of a particular problem situation rather than as a
source of testable hypotheses.
Method
For three reasons it was decided that a matching-from-sample
technique, using fairly large arrays, should be used in preference to pair
comparison, three-choice oddity problems, or matching from small samples
The first is the emphasis placed by differentiation theory on the relational
nature of distinctive features. It is only in a particular context that the
distinctions/
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distinctions between members of the stimulus set in terms of their feature
patterns become relevant; and if non-random confusion errors are
anticipated it seems important to provide the opportunity for regularity
in the properties of the stimulus set to be detected and used. This is linked,
secondly, to the way in which "same" is understood; the limits of the
subject's comprehension are most directly tested by observations of the sets
of figures which he defines as being "the same. " A relevant consideration
here is the finding (Bryant, 1969), that children even somewhat older than
this group have great difficulty in successive discrimination problems except
under specially-arranged conditions of presentation. The inference from this
is that regularities In a stimulus set would not be detected or used if the
whole set was not available at one time. Finally there is the practical
problem of number of stimulus presentations. An economical method of
data-gathering is essential with small children, and this would not have been
possible given the amount of material to be presented if anything other than
a matching technique had been used.
A further consideration arose during pil ot testing of the stimulus
material, part of which was concerned with the feasibility of using pair
comparl son presentation. It was found that, particularly with figures differing
only in orientation, there was a tendency for children between three and four
years of age to label the figure and to base their judgements on the label.
The question asked was "Is this picture just the same as this one?" accompanied
by/
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by appropriate pointing by the experimenter. For example, when faced
with two ellipses in different orientations a typical response to this question
would be, "That's an egg, and that's an egg", or "Both eggs", rather than
a direct "yes" and "no". Although similar labelling occurred at times
with the larger arrays finally used in the experiment proper, particularly
with the younger children, it was much easier to get the child to accept
the idea that he was being asked something other than whether all the pic¬
tures were of the same thing.
The three sets of stimulus materia! shown in Fig. II were chosen.
Series I, where orientation differences alone are used, represented a set of
problems of increasing difficulty as measured by the number of errors made
during pilot testing. It was intended to be the main index of change over
time, as shape discrimination, as would be expected, was found to be
relatively simpler even for younger subjects. Studying orientation separately
implies disagreement with the point of view expressed by Wohlwil! and
Weiner (1964) to the effect that orientation discrimination is merely a
special case of the more general issue of form discrimination. The lack of
any immediately obvious distinguishing features in the former case, linked
to the questions of the aspects used in differentiating among such material,
provides some a priori grounds for accepting a qualitative difference between
the two types of situation.
Series II and III were both intended to provide information on shape
discrimination in relation to both shape and orientation differences, but from
distinct points of view. Series II provided as much variation of attributes as
possible,/
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possiole, while retaining an array of manageable size, to see what kinds
of confusion errors were made when figures differed in shape, orientation,
»
number of sides, and 'n being open or closed. Straight vs. curved dis¬
criminations were not tested, as children in our subjects' age group never
confused rectilinear and curvilinear figures during pilot testing. With
series III a more systematic approach to the same problem was attempted;
apart from the two closed figures, retained as a further check on Series II
findings, the choice set varied only in orientation (two values) and degree
of openness (three values). The object here was to see if this minimum
regularity in stimulus attributes would be reflected in any systematic fashion
in response patterns.
Subjects
Twenty-three children were tested twice, at mean ages three years
eight months (range 3-4 to 4-0) and four years nine months. There were
twelve male and eleven female subjects; in addition one bay, who was not
available at the second occasion, is included in the results of the first testing.
The two testing sessions are referred to hereafter as pretest and post-test
respective ly.
Presentation
The figures comprising the three series were drawn in black ink on
three-inch square white cards, which were then covered with washable plastic.
During each session the experimenter and subject sat at a small table,
appropriate/
appropriate to the size of the subject, with the experimenter on the
subject's right. Series ! problems were presented one at a time, the
experimenter laying out the comparison array as shown in Fig. II with a
duplicate of the standard figure just below the centre of the array. The
experimenter pointed to the standard, told the subject to have a good
look at it, and then said, "See if you can find a picture up here that's
the same as this one," running his finger slcwly along the line of com¬
parison figures as he did so and pointing again at the standard at the
words "... this one". Three different problems were used to introduce
the task; with these, errors were explained and correct matches indicated.
This was not done with the experimental problems; with these the experi¬
menter made general approving comments, for example, "Good, that's
the way", irregularly and no matter what the response was. The arrays for
Series I! and III were laid out as shown in Fig. II, duplicate copies of the
standard being placed in the gap in the bottom row. Instructions were the
same as for Series I, but with no introductory examples, and no correction
of errors. Order of presentation of the standard figures was the same for
all subjects, and bore no relation to the order of figures in the array. The
three series were presented in the order of their numbering, problems 3 and 4
of Series I being presented again after Series III with the choice set laid out
in the alternative order shewn.
All subjects were quite happy to "come and play games" or "look
at some puzzles". Time for a full session varied between fifteen and twenty
minutes,/
minutes, depending on the amount of time taken up by general conversation
between problems, but care was taken to see that subjects attended to each
one as it was presented. No restrictions were placed on the amount of
comment on the material or the number of matches mode in any one
problem; the experimenter did not respond to the former situation, and
only queried the subject in the latter if it was said that all the figures were
the same. In this instance he was asked if there was one which was just
the same as the standard; again a multiple response was accepted if it
was made.
RESULTS
Detailed figures are available in the paper by Taylor and Wales
(1970), presented as an addendum to this dissertation. Only summary
statistics are given here. Each series will be considered singly; this is
followed by an overview of performance in all three series in terms of
relevant common factors.
Series i
in the pretest two subjects gave the figure in position 1 in the
array as the match to the standard in all problems; their results are omitted
from the analysis.
Looking first at number of correct responses, there is considerable
improvement over time in both absolute and proportional terms, as can be
seen/
seen from Table I. The difference between correct choices on the two
occasions is highly significant by the Wiicoxon matched-pairs signed-
rank rest (N=20; T=J!32.5; p <.005 (one-tailed) ). The distribution of
choices over position in the array for each problem also changes between
pre- and post-test, as shown by the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
one-sample test; three of the fourteen distribution (of both first and
total choices in seven problems, two being repeats) depart significantly
from randomness in the pretest, whereas six do so in the post-test. The
force of these findings is somewhat reduced by the presence of a strong
position response bias. This is shown by comparing the number of times
a figure in a given position Sn the array is wrongly chosen as a match to
the standard with the number of times the choice of a figure in that


















The order of preference for positions is 4, 3, 1, 6, 2, 5, with the first two
being much more likely to be chosen than any of the others. Even taking
this/
this into consideration, however, it is evident that the ability to make
correct matches on the basis of orientation alone has increased considerably
in these subjects. The increase in total number of responses requires
comment; this is deferred until the results for the other two series have
been presented and a more general consideration of the use of stimulus
information is made.
Series II
Performance here was good in the pretest and improved in the
post-test, as shown by the increased number of correct responses, the drop
in total number of responses, and the relatively small number of confusions.
(Table II). The change in the first of these is again highly significant on













A multidimensional scaling analysis of the pre- and post-test
confusion matrices was carried out for the results of both Series II and III.
The/
The object of this technique is to find a spatial configuration for the
stimulus set, in as small a number of dimensions as possible, in which the
judged similarity of the members of the set to each other is reflected in
their proximity in the configuration. As used here, the assumption under¬
lying its application is that the more often two figures are confused the
more similar they are seen to be. Essentially the procedire involved is an
iterative one which finds the best-fitting monotonic relationship between
degree of similarity (number of confusion errors) and distance. A measure
of departure from monotonicity is given; in the version used here this
value is called Delta. The smaller this is, the better the obtained configu¬
ration as a representation of the data. A discussion of the place of multi¬
dimensional scaling models and methods in relation to data of this nature is
presented in Chapter 3; here it is only necessary to state that the method
used here was developed by J. Doran (see Doran and Hodson (1966) ), based
on principles adumbrated by Shepard (1962a, b) and Kruskal (1964a, b).
The configurations for pre- and post-test results on Series II are given
in Fig. III. Two dimensions give a perfectly satisfactory representation of
the data. The axes of the plot merely provide a (normalised) frame of
reference, and consequently are unlabelled. The features used in different¬
iating among the figures can be seen quite clearly; indeed in the post-test
the distinctions are more definite than they at first sight appear to be, because
of the small number of confusions made. The only changes between results
on the two occasions can be seen to be of degree rather than kind. The three
pairv^
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pairs of figures differing only in orientation are well separated, while each
member of each pair is close to the other (1 and 4, 2 and 7, 3 and 6).
There are two main lines of division, between open and closed figures and
three- and four-sided ones; the apparent violation of this in the position
of figure 5 in the post-test configuration is due more to the lack of errors
made in matches involving it, with twenty-three out of twenty-five being
correct. The two "unique" figures, 5 and 8, while being most closely
associated with the appropriate clusters (respectively open figures and closed
four-sided ones) are sufficiently distant from them to indicate that features
differentiating them are being detected and used to a fair extent. The
highest proportion of correct matches was made to these two figures at both
times. Figure 8 was the only one which in the post-test was matched to,
and had matched to it, a non-identical figure differing in some feature
other than orientation. Several subjects made comments along the lines of
"That's a wee bit the same" or "That's the same but bigger" when comparing
2 and 8, thus indicating that they were aware of their difference in appearance
but were uncertain as to whether or not they should call them "the same".
In the pretest figure 8 was matched to several othor figures a relatively large
number of times; there was no recognisably systematic reason for this and
the most plausible account of its popularity would seem to be a position
preference effect comparable to that already described for Series I.
With the experimental method used here, where every member of the
stimulus set is compared with the whole set, the full confusion matrix is
generated/
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generated rather than the half-matrix which (as will be described in Hie next
chapter) is normally taken as the starting-point for the analysis of similarities
data, fo anticipate somewhat, it is a virtually universal assumption in
discussions of similarity that it is a symmetric relation, that is, if A is
similar to B, then B is similar to A. It follows that the corresponding entries
in the two halves of a confusion matrix are expected to be identical, at least
within the limits of experimental error. This is not the case here. There
are quite substantial discrepancies between the number of times figure A is
matched to figure B and the number of matches of B to A. The presence
and size cf such asymmetries is determined by the total number of matches
made to each of the two figures involved, and the proportion of these that
are correct. Clearly if 50% of the matches made to one figure are correct
while 75% are to the other, the distributions of the erroneous responses would be
expected to be discrepant. Thus a comparison of the number of correct
responses made to each figure as standard should give as much information as
studying the asymmetries themselves. It has to be assumed before taking
such a step that such differences in response totals are not due to such extraneous
factors as position preference.
Omitting figure 8 from consideration, in view of the probable position
bias affecting responses involving it, six out of the seven asymmetries found
(three on each occasion) occur between pairs of figures differing only in
orientation. In the pretest, an average of 9% fewer correct matches are made
to figures 1 and 3 than to figures 4 and 6, the rotated versions of figures 1 and 3;
there/
there were 2% fewer matches to figure 7, the rotated square, than to
figure 2. A similar pattern is apparent in the post-test; an average of
14% more correct matches are made to figures 4 and 7 than to 1 and 2,
while only 7% fewer are made to 6 than to 3. Without wishing to make
too much of this incidental finding, it does suggest that a form which can
be coded as "x-plus", e.g. "square plus rotation", cn the analogy of
Woodworth's notion of schema-plus-correction, in terms of the context
in which it appears, is more readily detected than a simpler version.
Finally, at this point the two "deviant" subjects as defined by the
results of the classification experiment mentioned at the end of the previous
chapter should be considered. Their pretest performance on this series,
but not the others, mirrored that on the classification task. For one, "some
in some way" v/as clearly equivalent to "identical in ail respects"; he made
no errors, of either confusion or omission, here. The other, in contrast,
interpreted "same in some way" to mean non-identical; she got every item
on this series wrong, apparently following a rule of her own to the effect that
if you can't find a figure which is part of the standard, then find one of which
the standard is a part. The permissible conclusion would seem to be that
there is at least partial equivalence of performance across tasks, but at this
stage it is not possible to say under what conditions such comparability can be
expected.
Series III
Overall performance is less good here than in Series II, but nonethe¬
less improvement over time is demonstrated in terms of the same criteria, with
an/
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an equivalent- level of significance for the difference between numbers of
correct responses being yielded by the Wilcoxon test. Table III summarises
the results. The multidimensional scaling analysis shows that three dimensions
are required to represent the data adequately. The configurations are
given in Fig. IV. The two closed figures, 3 and 6, are well separated
from the rest in both plots, again demonstrating the lack of confusability
between open and closed figures. In the pretest, of the remaining six figures,
1, 2 and 4, with gaps uppermost, project in the opposite direction to 5, 7
and 8, with gaps at the side. Size of gap is reflected in the relative
proximity of 2 and 7, least open, and i and 8, most open; 4 and 5 are more
widely separated. This can be taken as indicating greater uncertainty in
comparisons involving this last pair. Further evidence of this is given by
the order of frequency in which the figures are matched to each other as
standards. For pairs 1 and 8, and 2 and 7, when one member of the pair
is the standard, the other is the figure which is most frequently incorrectly
matched to it; this is not the case for 4 and 5, where figure 8 is more often given














Thus/ there is evidence for the use of both shape and orientation
as criteria for differentiation at the younger age, in the making of judge¬
ments which, at least with the extreme values of the attributes available
here, can to some extent be described as systematic. Nevertheless the
relatively low number of correct responses together with the wide range of
figures matched to any given standard shows that at best this is only rudimentary.
On the criteria of number of correct responses and distribution of erroneous
matches over the available choice set, performance in the post-test shows
greater specificity in the use of attributes. There is still considerable room
for error, however, as can be seen from the scaling configuration. There are
no clearly-marked clusters. The figure pairs, 1 and 8, 2 and 7, 4 and 5 each
project in the same direction from the main plane of the plot, mirroring the
fuct that the figure most commonly confused with a given standard is the one
which is the same "shape" as it but in a different orientation. At the same time
figures differing in "shape" from the standard are also likely to be confused
with it, but to a lesser extent. Table IV helps to clarify the situation. Figures
differing from a standard in both shape and orientation are less likely to be matched
to it in both the pre- and post-test, but the tendency is more marked on the
latter occasion. Where there is only one attribute differentiating the figures,
as many errors occur in the post-test as in the pre-test when this is orientation,
but shape differences are more likely to be detected by the time of the second
testing. It therefore seems that the relatively greater regularity of response is
due firstly to the smaller number of incorrect matches and secondly to an increased
refinement/
refinement in the use of available stimulus information.
There is a larger number of asymmetries here than in Series II, but
no regularity even of the rather loose kind described there is apparent.
It may be that the features marking variation in this stimulus set are
less codable; but it is equally possible that these findings are fortuitous
and are the outcome of experimentally irrelevant factors such as position
bias or random error.
Table IV





















However, with experimental material such as that used here, where
stimulus attributes are clearly not of equal value when it comes to different¬
iating among the members of the set, the presence of a feature which to
some extent is not used in discriminating between them might well produce
such an effect; whereas "X" may be considered to be to some extent similar
to/
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to "X-pius", the reverse is not the case. This suggestion is explored more
fully in Experiment 3, where orientation differences are not present in one
of the stimulus sets used, and where it may be assumed that a more equal
weighting is given to the attributes comparing the set than would seem to
be the case here.
The order of difficulty of the three Series, in terms of proportion
of correct responses, is II, III, I, in both pre- and post-tests. This would be
expected in view of the relatively greater difficulty of orientation discrimin¬
ation for children of an age comparable to our subjects, and of the greater
variety of attributes marking differences between the figures in Series II in
comparison with Series III. What was not anticipated is that the order of
difference in number of total responses between pre- and post-test is identical;
there is a fall in Series II, a somewhat smaller one in Series III, and a not
inconsiderable rise in Series I. The amount of increase here is not equivalent
on all problems; it is most noticeable in problems 3 and 4 and their repeats,
while in contrast number of responses to problems 1 and 2 drop fractionally,
Inspection of the distribution for problems 1, 3 and 4 suggests that global factors
of similarity between the stimulus figures, such as obliquity, are being
detected; and that this is in turn related to the 'simplicity* of the problem,
simplicity being defined in terms of proportion of correct responses. Thus on
problem 1 in the pre-test, 15 of the 27 responses are correct; of the remainder,
6 are to the figure in position 3. This is the only other vertically-orientated
figure/
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figure in the array. By the time of the post-test performance on this
problem has improved to the extent that this kind of analysis is no longer
relevant; 22 out of 25 responses are correct. Taking problems 3 and 4 at
the post-test, tn the former the figure in position 2 (position 5 in the second
presentation), the only "vertical" figure in an otherwise "horizontal"
array, is chosen four times out of a total of 100 responses for the two^
presentations, and in the latter, figures in positions 1 and 3 (3 and 2
respectively on 4R), the two non-oblique figures in the array, are picked
eight times out of 94 responses. The standards in these cases fall in the
more frequently chosen class of comparison figures. Since the directionality
of the figures in problems 2 and 5 is virtually nil in comparison with the
others, there is no point in examining the distribution of responses there
from this point of view.
These findings, and their context, suggest an interaction over time
between accuracy of response and number of responses made. Looking at the
more difficult problems in Series I (3 and 4) at the pretest, it is clear
that response is either random or based on position preference; this can be
taken as representing the lowest level of performance. On problem 1 at
the same time, on the other hand, some regularity is apparent, in that more
than half the responses are correct, and that the largest number of errors is
made with a figure which can be described as "more similar" to the standard
than the others, in terms of their sharing a common orientation. (This figure
is also in position 3, the second most commonly chosen position in the array;
it/
it will be shown that the chances of position preference affecting this
finding are small). Here a larger number of responses are made than on
the post-test, where errors are minimal, as in the number of additional
responses. At this time, the response pa'.tern for problems 3 and 4 has
changed, and corresponds more to that for problem 1 on the pre-test; there
is a larger number of correct responses, and again some regularity is apparent.
Thus it seems that there are three distinct stages or levels of develop¬
ment of performance in a form discrimination situation apparent in these
results. The first is that of virtual non-competence, where a small number
of responses is given which are based at least as much on extraneous factors
such as position preference as on stimulus attributes. At the second ievel
number of responses increases, as gross features of similarity come to be
detected; at the same time the number of correct responses also goes up,
if only because of the increased chances of getting the right answer when
more answers are given. And finally, the stimulus information defining the
unique correct match is picked up, with a corresponding increase in correct
responses and decrease in number of multiple reSponses (i.e. more than
one comparison figure matched to the standard). Obviously level of perfor¬
mance at any one time will vary with differences in both problems and
subjects; nevertheless, we would expect reasonably steady progress through
these stages over time, with little if any regression to lower levels.
Subjects were classified, in terms of their performance on all Series,
into/
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into three categories. The second one described here was originally split
into three sub-divisions (Taylor and Wales, 1970, Table IX): this has not
been done here for reasons of simplicity of presentation. Criteria for
inclusion in the lowest category (A) were no more than 25% multiple
responses and no more than 25% correct responses, and for the highest (C)
no more than 25% multiple responses and no less than 75% correct responses.
The second category (B) accommodated all subjects between these extremes.
It can be seen from Table V that there is a steady upward trend over time.
This can be tested by calculating chi-square for each Series separately,
giving a 3 x 2 contingency table for stages by occasions.
Table V
Classification of Subjects by level of performance on all three




Pretest 11 4 4
A
Post-test 3 0 0
Pretest 12 12 14
B
Post-test 16 10 11
Pretest 0 7 5




The values are: Series I, 9.14; Series II, 5.93; Series III, 7.24. With
two degrees of freedom a value of 5.99 is significant at the 0.05 level.
Improvement in performance h terms of this system of classification is there¬
fore quite firmly established. Table V! shows that there is relatively
little falling back. The greater number of subjects who show no change on
Series II and III reflects the fact that more of them had achieved the highest
level of performance in the pre-test.
Table VI




Down 3 2 3
No change 4 10 8
The variable difficulty of different types of problem at any time can
also be tested, again using chi-square, with the data contained in Table V.
Here two 3x3 contingency tables are formed, of stages by Series, one for
each occasion. With four degrees of freedom, a value of 9.49 or greater is
required to reach the 0.05 level; the obtained values for pre- and post-test
results are respectively 11.90 and 12.75.
The evidence for the changes in strategy described above is fairly good.
Before/
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Before it can be fully accepted, however, it must be shown that subjects
in category B, those who are taken to be using global criteria of similarity
in making their many responses, are in fact using stimulus features as the
basis for their choices rather than position preference. This can be done
by looking at the number of times subjects in category B described one or
other of the comparison figures in problems 3 and 4, Series 1, which have
been described above as being less similar to the standard in gross terms,
as a match to it. In problems 4 and 4R one of these figures was in position
3, the second most commonly chosen one in both the pre- and post-test.
Table VII shows the number of responses to these "less similar" figures in
relation to the total number of responses made by subjects in category B.
Table VII
Influence of gross features of similarity on responses of













3 17 43 2 1
3R 13 30 5 2
4 14 34 1,3 1
4R 10 28 3,2 2
It is quite clear that if position preference is affecting their judgements, it is
certainly not predominant, and that global features of similarity are much
more/
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more likely to be responsible for the distribution shown.
DISCUSSION
It is clear that any description of the uses of stimulus attributes in this
experiment has to take into consideration the level at which the subject is
performing. The evidence for the developmental sequence of strategies which
has been inferred from these results is sufficiently compelling for it to be given
due weight in any discussion of form discrimination; it is perhaps the most
important finding to come out of this study, inasmuch as it gives some indication
of the kind of changes involved as the child progresses to the level of full
competence in handling perceptual tasks of this nature.
The transition from the first to the second level is analogous to a phenomenon
noted in a different context by Donaldson (1963), an increase in errorfollowing
the partial development of new abilities in the child. Clearly the analogy is not
perfect, in that errors decrease here, but a similar process would seem to be
involved. It appears that the child comes to realise (not in any conscious sense)
that more factors have to be taken into account in a problem solving situation
than had hitherto been considered, but that the capacity to process these additional
aspects takes rather longer to develop. As a result there is a qualitative change
in performance, which may be reflected in a greater number of erroneous responses,
or, as is the case here, a greater number of responses and hence of correct ones.
In both cases the effect comes from a greater awareness of the features of the
situation/
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situation which are relevant to the successful completion of the task imposed,
but an awareness which is not as yet sufficiently educated to be able to filter
out irrelevant aspects. This level of competence is represented in the third
stage described above, where most responses are correct and few confusions
are made.
Further clarification of the issues involved requires a brief consideration
of the different ways in which "same" can be used. That given here is
modelled on the presentation by Donaldson and Wales (1968). The first sense
is that where "same" refers to the identity of one object over time, as in
"I still have the same car." Three different senses of "same" can be
distinguished when two or more objects are compared at any one time; where
the objects are identical in respect of all observable attributes, where they are
identical with respect to at least one observable attribute, but also differ with
respect to at least one, and finally where they are classified as "the same"
in terms of non-observable attributes, e.g. "Women are all the same."
Only the two cases relating to observable attributes are relevant here.
It is clear, both from the results of the classification task mentioned above, and
from the performance of subjects classified at stage B in this experiment, that
pre-schoc! children are quite well able to understand the relation of partial
identity and that they can apply it systematically in some situations. Relatively
few, on the other hand, are able to work in terms of complete identity; even
those who have reached stage C make some confusion errors. However, the non-
equivalente of performance with different types of stimulus material on both
testing/
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testing occasions indicates that the capacity to use this understanding is
limited by the complexity, in some sense, of the task involved. The child
appears to have an adequate conception of similarity, broader perhaps than
that of an adult but not grossly deviant from it. (cf. the difficulty some
subjects had, having described the square and rectangle of Series II as "a
wee bit the same", in deciding whether or not to classify them as "same" or
"not-same"), but is unable to apply it in certain situations because he is unable
to find the necessary information in the stimuli. Thus, the pattern typical
of stage A appears, with essentially irrelevant factors guiding responses.
The increase in number of responses at stage B, where the choices made can
be shown to reflect some degree of similarity to the standard figure, demon¬
strates both the development of the realisation that there is a principled basis
for answering the question "Is this the same as this?" and a lack of specificity
in utilising the stimulus information which provides this basis.
As far as the question of the interaction between discrimination perform¬
ance and the use of the relation of similarity is concerned, it is clear that
changes in response patterns with time reflect increasing sophistication in the
detection of the stimulus information in terms of which comparative judge¬
ments are made rather than any alteration in the child's understanding or
application of the relation. This statement only applies, obviously, once the
concept has become established in the child, which can be taken to be at a
younger age than that of these subjects given the results of the classification
task. The following conclusions can be drawn about the other two issues
mentioned/
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mentioned os a focus of this experiment, the use made of stimulus
features which are criterial for differentiating between the figures and
whether or not errors show any systematic pattern. The results from
Series II and III show that even at three-and-a-half children can discriminate
between figures of different shape with considerable success, and that there
are quite distinct class boundaries to the confusion errors that they do make.
The number of sides to a figure, and whether or not it is open or closed, are
used more often than orientation as differentiating criteria. With a more
systematic set of stimulus figures, as in Series III, it can be demonstrated
that fewer confusion errors will be made the greater the number of attributes
there are marking the difference between figures.
In both these Series, the emphasis on the use of shape as a determinant
of similarity rather than orientation, indicates that the former has greater
value as a distinguishing feature. From Series I results, we know that
orientation differences can be detected, but it appears that where other
attributes vary as we!!, this is much less iIkely to occur. The work of
Vurpillot (1968) is relevant here. She extended the Russian findings (Zaporo-
zhets, 1964) on the irregularity of visual scanning in children up to the age
of five by demonstrating that not only are systematic scanning strategies, where
each part or attribute of a figure is compared with the corresponding feature
of another, slow to develop, but that younger children also fail to search the
stimuli fully and so make their comparative judgements on the basis of only
partial information. A similar state of affairs seems to hold for the results
reported/
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reported here; once one common feature is detected In a pair of figures,
the search for further confirming or disconfirming information is discontinued.
Where orientation is the only distinguishing feature present in a stimulus
set, it is more difficult for the child to detect the criteria! differences; the
poorer level of performance on Series I shows this quite clearly. There is
fair evidence that gross features of similarity such as obliquity are detected
as the child takes its first steps along the road to systematic error-free
responding; however, it is only with stimulus figures where directionality
is clearly marked that this can be expected to be demonstrated. This finding
is more in accord with Rosenblith's (1965) comment that figures may "behave"
differently under similar transformations, that different error patterns may be
obtained depending on the relations holding between the standard and the
choice set, than with the suggestion made by Gibson et al (1962), that trans¬
formation type alone is a more useful predictor of error. It has been seen that
a 90° rotation of a horizontally or vertically oriented standard figure (problems
1, 3 and 3R, Series I) is less likely to be confused with it than is a comparison
figure rotated 90° from an oblique standard (problems 4 and 4R, Series I).
To sum up the findings of this experiment, therefore, it can be said
that at least with children of the age of these subjects, errors in a matching-
from-sample discrimination task are due more to failure to detect criterial
distinctive features and to make an exhaustive search for these than to their
using "same" in an incorrect fashion; the reference of the term to a relation
between two or more figures is understood, and it is interpreted as indicating
at least partial identity between figures. Improvement of performance over
time/
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time is the result of increased specificity in the detection and use of
distinctive stimulus features. Individual differences in attainment of
different levels are wide, but the sequence is quite steady; following the
initial essentially random stages of responding, where features of the total
experimental situation are as likely to determine responses as stimulus
attributes, a stage is reached where wide but systematic classes of similar
figures are defined, the sense of similarity here being that of partial identity.
This gives way to the final stage where correct and unique matches are made,
with criteria! distinctive features being detected and irrelevant ones ignored.
Comparing these results with those of the studies reviewed earlier
leads to the suggestion that conclusions about the factors most likely to
influence form discrimination are going to depend very much on the experimental
context in which the question is studied. Whatever the relation between the
standard and comparison figure^), once the child has passed the first stage
described here his response is going to be systematic to some extent. However,
it is only in the situation where a large comparison array is available and an
unrestricted range of responses is open to him that this will be clearly seen,
unless he has reached the final stage of making correct unique matches.
Transformation type is less important than the nature of the standard figure in
predicting errors, but again this is only fully apparent in a relatively unstructured
situation. As to the type of distinctive feature that is most likely to affect
discrimination one way or the other, there seems little point in being dogmatic.
Orientation is more difficult to use than one which alters the shape of a figure,
but/
but nevertheless can be and is detected. In general, it seems fair to say
that any difference between figures can provide a basis for differentiation,
if it can be detected, and that its detection is largely a function of the
child's ability to make a systematic search of the stimulus figures.
The question of the use of stimulus features will be examined
much more fully in the next series of experiments to be described, along
with other issues. Before this however, it is necessary to discuss certain
theoretical and methodological problems raised by this study.
Chapter 3
The Concept of Similarity
The issues to he discussed here can be summarised briefly in the
form of three questions: What is being discriminated? How is it being
discriminated? How adequately are the discriminations being made?
These somewhat clumsy formulations can be more accurately rephrased
in terms of the discussion of similarity as an abstract concept given by
Donaldson and Wales (1968), where two or more entities are described as
similar if they are partially or totally equivalent with respect to their
observable attributes or features. The first question then becomes, What
are the elements of the stimulus set presented to the subject, which are
defined or definable by the experimenter? The problem posed here is
that of the specification of stimulus properties in advance of, or at least
independently of, the subject's evaluation of them. The second question
is intended to emphasise the judgemental aspect of the subject's task, and
in fact brecks down into two distinct parts. The first of these includes the
notion, previously discussed at some length, of the subject's understanding
and use of "same"; it refers to the decision rule on the basis of which he
assigns members of the choice or comparison set of stimulus figures to the
categories "Match standard"/ "do not match standard." The second part
relates to the detection of salient stimulus features, on the basis of which
the decision is made. Again, two separable issues are involved in the third
question. There is the methodological one of the type of analysis appropriate
to/
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to the examination of similarity judgements, and the assumption involved
in the various alternatives; the other is concerned with the adequacy of
the subject's representation of the relations holding between the members
of the stimulus set. The two parts of the second question, and the latter
part of the third, are quite obviously to be answered empirically, and indeed
they represent the basic concerns of this thesis. Consideration of the other
points, however, is a necessary preliminary to their experimental examination.
The relevance of these questions to the study of form discrimination
can be brought out more ciearjy if we consider the situation In more general
terms. Some years ago Galqpter (1956) presented an analysis of the problem
of "... (studying) the order of the organism's experience as determined by
a study of behaviour." He started by pointing out that the content of
experience cannot, in an objective psychology, be communicated directly,
only in terms of the structure or relationship between perceived (experienced)
objects, as in such statements as "red looks more like orange than green does."
Taking as an example the subject matter of classical psychophysics, Galonter
points out that three things must be considered. One is the distribution of
physical energy underlying a particular area of experience, such as sound
pressure, which can be ordered in terms of physical measurements; another
is the experience resulting from exposure to such physically-defined events,
which can be seen under appropriate conditions of examination to reflect to
some extent the order inherent in them. Thirdly, there is the function which
maps the one order into the other, although not in any one-to-one sense.
The/
49.
The central problem for Galonter is the construction of a map for each
sense realm which will assign a unique position to each element in the
realm in such a way that increased likeness of experience of two elements
will be reflected in their closer proximity in the map. It is clear that
what is being attempted here is a very general, context-free, construction;
many experiments carried out since Gaianter's paper was published indicate
that this is not justifiable, for example, Garner (1966). Galointer's formu¬
lation, however, is applicable to the problems with which we are faced
here. Experienced order, or, to revert to more appropriate terminology,
the perceived structure of a stimulus set, has to be related to its physical
structure in such a way that we are able to make some inferences about the
way in which the latter has been mapped into the former and so come to
some conclusions about the nature of the subject's information processing
capabilities.
What we require, in fact, is a normative model in the sense described
by Garner and Morton (1969). The purpose of such a model, vh ich is
usually expressed in mathematical form, is the establishment of a baseline
against which performance can be compared. This emphasis is important;
the correctness or otherwise of the model is not to be evaluated only in
terms of the adequacy with which it accounts for the data, but also in the
extent to which it reflects the theoretical points which the user intends it to
reflect. Thus we must try to find a model which will provide an explicit
comparison between the perceived and physical structure of the stimulus set
in/
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in such a way that1 discrepancies can be accounted for interms of the
processes used by the subjects in deriving the latter from the former.
From a more empirical point of view the importance of providing a principled
description of the stimulus set is evident in the quotation taken from
E. Gibson (1969), given on p.l of the Introduction. Since we are concerned
with "... the growth of ability to detect regularity, order and structure," it
is necessary to provide suitable opportunities for such ability to be expressed.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that, with those subjects who were capable
of responding at anything beyond a random level, there were quite clear-
cut classes of figures which were confused with each other; open figures
were rarely matched with closed ones, for example, and where the stimulus
set was defined by two attributes only, figures differing from the standard
on both attributes were less often confused with it than were those differing
on one. Some regularity of response pattern, mirroring the features of the
stimuli, was therefore apparent. However, the lack of any systematic
relation between the stimulus classes in the material of Series II, and the use
of an attribute (orientation) which is associated with particular difficulties
in discrimination in Series III precludes a complete assessment of the ability
of young children to detect and process class relations within these stimulus
sets when presented as a discrimination task.
The notion of structure as used here can again best be presented in the
terms used by Imai and Garner (1968); "... the relations between stimuli or
the attributes forming a set of stimuli, rather than the isolated properties of
the/ . .
the stimuli themselves. " E.J. Gibson's discussion of distinctive
features emphasises their relational character; describing a feature as
distinctive makes sense only in the context firstly of other features which
do not have this role and secondly of a set of stimuli which can be partitioned
on the basis of the particular feature. In fact it is a moot point as to
whether a feature, or a set of features, is accurately described as relational;
it is the description of the elements of the stimulus set, in terms of a
feature list, which is relational and is important here. We can talk of a
number of different types of structural relations. There is the structure of
the total stimulus set, and that of the sub-sets into which it can be divided,
as defined by the experimenter; and there is the structure of, in this
context, the sub-set of the total stimulus set which the subject defines as
equivalent in terms of his confusion errors, it is the comparison between the
structure of the subject's sub-set and that of the sub-sets available to him in
the total set that provides the basis for inferences about his perceptual
functioning.
As Imai and Garner go on to point out, structure can be defined in
either metric or non-metric terms. Strictly speaking the latter should be
apparent only in qualitative differences between stimuli; that is stimuli would
be either identical or non-identical, and if the latter, then it should not be
possible to make any further statements on the nature or degree of the
difference between them. In practice, however, this is not feasible, as even
the counting of numbers of attributes in common can be considered as a
simple/
simple kind of quantification. !mai and Garner's solution to this problem
was to demonstrate empirically that, within a set of nine stimuli generated
by two attributes (shape and colour) with three levels of each (circle, square,
triangle: red, blue, ye I low),perceived similarity depended only on the
number of attributes by which stimuli differed. Thus two stimuli differing
only in colour were judged to be as similar as two stimuli differing only
in shape, and both pairs were judged to be more similar than v/as a pair
differing in both shape and colour. The distinction of importance thus
comes down to that between continuous attributes, where differences in
level or value of the attribute can be expressed in terms of a numerical
scale, and discrete attributes, where differences in level are of kind rather
than degree. Shape is an instance of the iatter; there is no continuum
connecting triangles, quadrilaterals and circles. The former presents
greater difficulties, however. It is possible to think of a metric underlying
the attribute of colour, particularly if we consider the three components of
luminance (brightness), purity (saturation) and wavelength (hue), each of
which has a distinct scale associated with both its radiant energy or physical
aspect and its observable or psychological aspect. If, however, we extract
three colours from widely separated areas of the colour solid these can be
taken as discrete qualities, with the immediately-observab le differences
between them making insignificant the fact that they stand on a common
set of dimensions. Orientation is another such ambiguous attribute, inasmuch
as it can be conceived of in either dimensional or class terms, in a way
exactly/
exactly analogous to the case of colour.
A final point to be taken account of in choice of stimulus specification
is the nature of the relationship between the attributes comprising the
stimuli. A number of authors have commented on the distinction between
unanalysable and analysable stimuli. Shepard (1964) describes "... those
that are reacted to as homogeneous, unitary wholes, and those that tend
to be analysed into perceptually distinct components or properties", and
Torgerson (1965) talks of multidimensional attributes as contrasted with
sets of stimuli varying on several distinct attributes. Colour is the standard
example of the former class, while the latter refer to figures such as those
used by Shepard, which varied in size of circle and in inclination of
radius. This distinction is of more than theoretical interest; there is
considerable empirical evidence, which will be reviewed at a later stage,
that stimulus sets differing in this respect are processed h different ways.
With one exception (Brown and Goldstein, 1967) ail the studies
reviewed in Chapter 1 used stimulus material which varied in discrete
rather than continuous attributes. Those where orientation discrimination
alone was studied used at most a two-choice matching task; the conclusion
drawn from the results was that particular types of rotation or reversal
were more difficult to discriminate than others, and that the context provided
by the stimulus display could affect the ease with which the figures could
be differentiated. However, with a larger set of comparison figures, as
was used in Series I of Experiment I here, the findings suggested that it
way'
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was not the absolute nature of the difference between the standard and
comparison figures which was important, but rather the relation between the
features of both. A figure rotated 90° from the standard is more likely to
be confused with it when both are oblique than when thettwo are aligned
along the horizontal-vertical dimensions. Thus by increasing the amount
of information (in the non-technical sense) avcilable to the subject in the
structure of the total set of stimuli to which he is responding, grounds are
provided for extending the permissible inferences about the way in which
they are processed.
Of the form discrimination studies cited, that by Birch and Lefford
x
(1967) made use of a stimulus set with relatively little definable structure
to it, much as in Series II of Experiment 1. The minimal number of errors
made by their subjects, the most common one being a failure to detect,
or at least to respond to, an orientation difference, made any analysis
of response patterns in terms of confusion errors irrelevant. The two Gibson
studies, however, produced more fruitful material. In both a higher degree
of structure was available to the subjects, but of a different kind. Gibson
et a! (1962) used the same transformations of a number of different forms,
and their conclusions were based on generalisations across results from
stimulus sets which v/ere conoecfed by (ostensible) equivalence of difference
between the standard and the comparison figures. Only within one trans¬
formation type, straight line to curve or vice versa, were the different
levels, represented here by the number of lines which were varied in the
comparison figure, related in any way; and results showed that the greater
the/
the number of points of difference between the figures, the smaller was
the likelihood of their being confused. Different degrees of rotation and
types of reversal were shown to produce different error rates, but the
inferences drawn have been shown to be accurate only to a limited degree,
because of the restricted nature of the standard figures chosen (see Rosenblith's
(P65) comments, p. 43 below).
However, the structure of such stimulus sets is limited by virtue of the
fact that each comparison figure differs from the standard in terms of only
one feature; with straight/curve and rotation or reversal transformations
a number of values were provided, thus giving some indication of the connection
between degree of difference between figures and their perceived similarity,
but in no sense were there any links between the four major dimensions of
difference in the comparison set. Thus relations between features, and their
respective utility in a discrimination task, can be assessed only in terms of
number of confusions of certain types of transformation with the standard
figure at different ages.
The second study (Gibson et ai, 1964) examined the discrimination of
upper-case letters of the alphabet. The use of a list of bipolar features to
describe the elements of the stimulus set produced a definition of its
structural relations where the degree of similarity between any two elements
was reflected in the number of features they had in common; here, therefore,
structural relations within the total set are defined. The experimental findings
indicated that the more similar letter pairs were, in terms of their common
features,/
features, the more likely they were to be confused; a multidimensional
scaling analysis of the obtained confusion matrices suggested that tv/o
features, straight-curve and relative obliqueness, were particularly
important for discrimination. The intention of this study was to clarify the
dimensions of difference between letters which are criteria! for identifying
them, and its outcome, showing good agreement between the structural
description of the stimuli and the subjects' perception of if, indicates that
the former was well-founded.
The Brawn and Goldstein study is representative of an approabh to the
problem of stimulus specification which has come to be known as form
psychophysics. Much work has been done in this area and it will be considered
in some detail. Its initial impetus came from an article by Attneave and
Arnoulf (1956), describing several methods for generating and quantifying
random polygons. Stressing the importance of formal or relational factors
in perception, they were concerned with systematising these in order that
results from one experimental situation might be generalised not only to
different subjects but also to new stimuli. They accepted, without argument,
that the psychophysical paradigm is appropriate, although the difficulties
raised by the multidimensional nature of shape (as contrasted with the usually
unidimensional nature of stimuli used in psychophysical experiments), the
variation in the number of dimensions needed to describe a shape as its
complexity increases, and the lock of knowledge about the psychological
relevance of such physically specified dimensions, were acknowledged. The
problem/
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problem of generalising from a given set of stimuli was broken down into
two parts, one that of defining the stimulus domain, that is the set of stimulus
figures to which results may be generalised, which is to be done in terms of
the statistical parameters characterising it, and the other that of producing a
sample v/hich has ecological validity in Brunswik's sense, necessary if results
are to be generalised to natural forms. Only the first of these was discussed,
the second being taken as a special case of the more general issue.
The body of their paper presents a number of different rule systems for
generating, on a random basis, polygons of different types together with a
discussion of various ways of quantifying them. A stimulus domain is thus
defined in terms of the set of rules used to produce the figures. The authors
conclude, however, on a somewhat pessimistic note; "... It appears unlikely
that any single system of physical measurement can be optimal for all psycho¬
physical interactions ... there is no quick and easy way to determine which
physical measurements have greatest psychological relevance: only experi¬
mentation can answer this question." (Attneave and Arnouit, 1956, p. 470.)
Much research was carried out following the appearance of this paper,
with emphasis on the development of a viable psychophysics of form perception.
However, a review of the literature, (Michels and Zusne, 1965) made it quite
clear that the basic problems, to dc with the most appropriate metric for quanti¬
fication of visual form and the use of this in prediction, had been largely undisturbed.
Since then an extensive programme, on this same topic, has been launched by
D.R. Brown and his colleagues. The first paper in their series stated the thesis
that "... the study of measurement and sampling of stimuli is propaedentic to
further/
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further development of a psychophysics of form perception" (Brown and Owen,
1967, p. 243), without any discussion of whether or not the psychophysical
model is in fact the most appropriate one when applied to form perception.
They selected as their stimulus population a large sample of random polygons,
generated by Attneave and Arnault's Method 1; 200 at each of five "sidedness
levels" (4, 3, 12, 16 and 20 sides) were used. Two considerations dictated
this choice of material, the more obvious being the popularity in previous
studies of such stimulus sets. The other was that material of this nature varied
both in type of attribute differentiating among figures and also in amount of
each attribute present in eoch one. Eighty different measures were applied to the
population; these were based on angle size, length of side, area, perimeter units,
radial iength, and co-ordinates. Moments of the distribution were calculated
for these values. Values of the different measures across stimuli were correlated
in an R-technique factor analysis, so that factors were defined in terms of clusters
of measures rather than of stimulus figures.
It was found fhat the number of factors required to account for a given
percentage of variance of the 80 measure variables increased with the number of
sides in each stimulus sample, indicating that the number of independent measures
required to achieve a given level of description is directly related to the number of
sides of the figures. The nature of the factors was discussed using resuits from the
quadrilateral and 12-sided figures, as typical of the remainder of the findings.
However, the presentation was restricted to the first five factors, accounting
respectively for 74% and 58% of the matrix variance for the two samples, on the
ground/
ground that these accounted for a relatively large proportion of the variance,
were meaningfully interpretable, and that the remaining factors in each case
contributed small and approximately equivalent increments. These factors were
labelled: compactness, being a measure of the dispersion of the perimeter or
area of a figure from its centre of gravity; jaggedness, related to the proportion
of acute interior angles; skewness of area and perimeter relative to the x and y
axis. A large number of individual measures were correlated with each of these.
The authors also tackled the question of sampling variability. This was done
by considering repeated samples of stimuli from a given population as providing
estimates of the values of the statistical parameters defining the population;
the stability of such estimates across samples thus provides an index of the
variability, or lack of it, to be expected in drawing different samples. The
method used was simply to compare the factor solutions at each sidedness level
for two random-sub-samples of 100 shapes, thus indicating the extent to which
relations among measures corresponded in the two sub-sampies. Quadrilateral
shapes showed a high degree of stability, but this fell off as the number of sides
increased. it was concluded that the degree to which shapes were free to be
unique increases as number of sides increases; as a result the correlation
between measures decreases, and larger samples are required with figures of a
greater number of sides to compensate for decreased stability.
Brown and Owen's study has been quoted at such iength because of the
thoroughness and rigour with which it was executed, and as the best available
example of the psychophysical approach to the problems of form perception.
In spite of this, their concluding statements, rather like those of Attneave and
Arnouit,/
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Arnoult, make depressing reading: "A reasonable attitude at this point ?n
time seems to be that we do not have the quantity or type of data needed to
arrive at final conclusions concerning a measurement system for shape."
(Brown and Owen, 1967, p. 257). And they end their paper with a quot¬
ation from Arnoult, published in 1960, which they describe as still approp¬
riate. In part, this reads, "The development of a psychophysics of form
still lies far in the future .... only the barest beginning has been made..."
The procedure they propose to adopt in order to refine the measurement of
form is a circular one. They point out, almost as an afterthought, that aspects
of similarity are involved, and that two approaches are possible in studying
perception. Either the conformity of subjects' similarity estimates to a
predefined stimulus domain can be assessed, or the domain can be specified
post hoc in terms of an analysis of subjects' responses. Their iterative process
combines both lines of attack, working back from experimental results to
more psychologically relevant form measures.
One of the most noteworthy features of Brown and Owen's paper Is the
increasing generality apparent as the argument develops. Starting from highly
specific physical measures, for example, the second area! moment of x, they
end up with factors labelled in terms of their appearance. The second areal
moment of x is one of the 29 measures with highest correlations on factor I,
compactness, for four-sided figures; but there is no suggestion that any one of
these is in any sense the best representative of the factor. The measures are,
obviously, highly intercorrelated, but not perfectly so; thus each one contributes
some unique information about the figures to which it is applied. Specificity
has/'
has been lost in two «enses, one that the stimuli are no longer defined
by any one measurement operation, the other that they are, of necessity,
described in psychological terms, applied by the authors, which are applicable
to the lowest common denominator of the outcomes of a number of physical
operations. The one-to-one, or even several-to-one, correspondence between
the physical and the psychological, between type and nature of stimulus and
the response to it, which is the basis of sensory psychophysics, is replaced by
a potentially many-one, or more likely many-several, relation.
Considering the proposed experimental programme for refining measurement
operations in the light of the goal of developing a characterisation of a
stimulus sample such that results can be generalised to new samples, another
difficulty arises, it has been seen that, even within a given level of
sidedness, the stability of the sample decreases as number of sides increases.
The implication is that conclusions based on experiments using less than the
whole set of 200 stimuli will vary in accuracy, depending on the number of
sides to the figures, perhaps to the extent that different conclusions about
perceptual functioning may be drawn from the use of different subsamples
of a defined population. Again the potential for departure from the tightness
of standard psychophysical relations is apparent.
The gist of these comments on the psychophysical approach to form
perception is that the effort is misconceived. Two further points can be
made here. One relates to the almost pathological attraction for psychology
of the splendours of mathematical rigour. Schwartz (1962), writing on the
role of mathematics in the formulation of physical theories, demonstrates quite
clearly/
clearly hov/ dangerous an Ill-thought-out application of such methods
can be in both the physical and social sciences. His basic argument is
quite simply that mathematics, like computers, is single-minded, literal-
minded and simple-minded, a most inarpropriate set of attributes in a
tool used by the scientist in attempting to deal with the iil-understood
approximations to reality which are his stock-in-trade. A few quotations
will make Schwartz' position clear; the implications for the present
discussion should be obvious: ".. .it (is) essential, if mathematics is to be
appropriately used in science, that the assumptions upon which mathematics
is to elaborate be correctly chosen from a larger point of view, invisible to
mathematics itself .... Mathematics is able to deal successfully only with
the simplest of situations, more precisely, with a complex situation only to
the extent that rare good fortune makes this complex situation hinge upon a
few dominant single factors": "Related to this deficiency ... .is the simple-
mindedness of mathematics - its willingness .... to elaborate upon any idea,
however absurd: to dress scientific brilliancies and scientific absurdities
alike in the impressive uniform of formulae and theorems. Unfortunately,
however, an absurdity in uniform is far more persuasive than an absurdity unclad
The second point concerns the kind of misconception that is evident; an
analogy with auditory experiments is the best way of doing this. In straight¬
forward psychophysical detection and recognition experiments in vision and
audition the stimuli used have quite definite physical representations, in terms
of wavelength, pitch, luminance, intensity, and so on. With auditory
stimuli, however, as soon as some kind of higher-order structure or pattern
is/
is imposed on them the representation changes. The structure can be
relatively trivial, for example, a short sequence of tones taking one of
two possible values, or more complicated, for example, speech sounds;
but experimenters using such materials do not start from a precise speci¬
fication of the sound patterns involved (cf. Royer and Garner, 1966). The
problem is too complex, perhaps because of the sequential nature of the
organisation inherent in the stimuli, but such an approach is also irrelevant,
in that more appropriate characterisations of the stimulus materia! are
available. These can vary from the complexities of linguistic theory to
the simplicity of the experimenter's intuition, the level to which Brown and
Owen retreat in the description of their form measure factors. That
organisation and structure of a type qualitatively distinct from that of radiant
energy are involved in two-dimensional forms is accepted by all who work
with them; it is therefore all the more surprising that a relatively uncritical
acceptance of a methodology appropriate to the study of lower-order
phenomena should be manifested. Brown and Gwen state, explicitly,
that aspects of similarity are involved in the type of problem they attempt
to resolve; but they make no attempt to shift their frame of reference to
take account of this, giving rather the impression that form psychophysics
is an end in itself rather than an experimental tool.
At this point it seems fair to say rhat the system used for the formal
specification of stimuli shcuid provide a complete and exclusive description
of/
of each member of the set in relation to every other one, so as to enable
subjects to show as unambiguously as possible what features they are using
and in what way they are using them. However, before examining further
evidence relevant to the selection of criteria to be used in deciding which
is the most appropriate form of representation of stimulus relations, some
attention must be given to the methods available for the analysis of
similarity data. In the area of experiment with which we are concerned,
discrimination tasks using a matching response, the data can take two basic
forms, latency of response or number of errors. The following comments
are restricted to the latter only, partly because this was the measure
used in the experiments reported here, but also and more importantly
because the two are not equivalent. This stems from the fact that time is
a continuous variable whereas matci/mismatch judgements are not. In
the hypothetical case of a series of stimuli of increasing similarity, it
would be expected that this would be reflected even for individuals, in a
corresponding increase in response latency; with matching errors, however,
there would be, in the individual case, a cut-off point separating the
perceived non-identical and identical stimuli. In this case a number of
subjects would be required to produce a similarity order rather than a
dichotomy. Furthermore, it is not immediately obvious what the equivalent
in terms of response latency would be to a failure to match two identical
stimuli. Standard statistical techniques can, of course, be applied, but
these are not designed to bring out the kind of structural relations which
are/
are being emphasised here, particularly where each member of a stimulus
set hcs been compared with every other. Multidimensional scaling (MDS)
is a recently-developed technique which is designed for just such problems;
the assumptions and methods it involves, and the nature of the solutions
provided by it, need to be considered in some detail.
The basic concept behind MDS is that similarity relaiions within a
set of objects can be represented as distances in an M-dimensional space.
The problem Is to find a monotonia transformation of the N (N~l)/2
similarity measures, obtained from a set of size N, which will convert
them into distances and so permit the construction of a configuration of the
N points such that the more similar two points are judged to be, the closer
they are in the configuration. A number of suggestions and techniques
have been put forward, of which three will be discussed here.
The first line of approach (Torgerson, 1958) used a two-stage procedure,
whereby an adaptation of standard one-dimensional scaling techniques was
first applied to the similarity measures to convert them to distances; the
second step was to derive the configuration whose interpoint distances
corresponded to those resulting from the first operation. However, the use of
a variance-dependent method, with the distributional assumptions entailed
in such an approach, together with the stringent requirements that the relation
between similarity measures and distance be linear and that the distances be
Euclidean, imposes severe restrictions on the applicability of this model.
A different approach was initiated by Shepard (1962a, b); his procedure,
and/
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and the development of it by Kruskcul (1964c, b), have been by far the
most widely used over the last decade. A version of it was used in the
analysis of the results of Experiment I. Here no assumptions are made
as to the form of the function relating similar!!y and distance. The only
requirement is that it be monotonic, that is, that distance increases as
similarity decreases; in practice, Shepard's technique attempts to find a
configuration such that the rank order of the interpoint distance is the
inverse of the similarity measures. Thus the vexed question of carrying out
arithmetical operations on ordinal data is sidestepped. Different problems
are now presented, however. One relates to the fact that it is always possible
to embed N points in a space of N-l dimensions. This would provide trivial
solutions, in that no real reduction of the original data to a more compre¬
hensible form is achieved. The number of dimensions defining the space
can only be lessened at the expense of a departure from a strict monotonic
relation between similarity measures and distance. The final solution is
therefore a compromise between maximising the goodness of fit of the
order of the interpoint distances to the order of similarity measures and
minimising the number of dimensions required for the representation of
the stimulus configuration. The procedure is iterative, in that an initial
randomly-generated configuration in N-l dimensions is adjusted until mono-
tonicity is achieved. The number of dimensions is then decreased by one
and the process repeated, if desired down to the one-dimensionai case.
There are a number of points of difficulty associated with this approach.
The/
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The first relates to the nature of the data. As has already been pointed
out (Chapter 2) it is assumed that similarity is a symmetric and reflexive
relation; the former is particularly necessary where a spatial model is
being utilised, since rhe straight line distance between two points is a
constant and therefore not subject to variation depending on the direction
taken between them. If asymmetries occur in the data, cs was the case
in Experiment I, they must be removed, by averaging, before MDS tech¬
niques can be applied. Potentially important information may thus be lost
unless such anomalies are considered in their own right.
The lack of any rigorous criterion for the evaluation of departure from
strict monotonicity in the function relating similarity and distance is
unfortunate. Certain values for the error term involved, be it discrepancies
in the rank order in the Shepard approach or the residual variance of the
monotone regression of distance on dissimilarity, called stress, in Kruskal's,
have been suggested on an empirical basis as suitable cut-off prints, but there
is no formal justification for this. Kruskal (1964a) has proposed that the
appropriate number of dimensions is that beyond which stress falis comparatively
littie; this point would be indicated by an "elbow" in the plot of stress
against number of dimensions. Thus the choice of finai configuration is to a
certain extent arbitrary. In practice there is little point in accepting a
configuration in more than three dimensions, as this would make its represent¬
ation virtually impossible, unless the departure from goodness of fit was so
great as to be quite unacceptable.
Linked/
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Linked to this is the question of interpretation. It is perhaps
unfortunate- that the name of the technique should incorporate the word
"dimension". This appears to hove suggested to certain authors (for
example, Behrman and Brown, 1968) that the prelections along individual
axes of the plot produced by an MDS program are the most relevant part
of the analysis. This is not the case, as can be seen by recalling what is
involved in producing the configuration. This is derived from the inter-
point distances which give the best approximation to the obtained similarity
measures. It is only in the context of the whole configuration thar the
spatial relations between the stimulus points are fully manifest, since only
then can the distance of each from each be accurately assessed. This is
not to soy that consideration of the individual dimensions is meaningless or
wrong, simply that it should not be taken for granted that they are the
most important aspects of the results. Behrman and Browr. plotted each
dimension of an MDS - derived configuration of 4-siaed random polygons
(taken from the sample described by Brown and Owen, 1967), all possible
pairs of stimuli having been rated for similarity, against various physical
measures of the forms. They found a good level of correlation between the
first two dimensions and two of their measures, but not with the third
dimension. The point here is that the attitude exemplified by this study fails
to consider the possibility that subjects may not be responding to the structure
the experimenter expects them to, and in addition overlooks the distinction
between continuous and discrete variation, or, as Torgerson (1965) puts it,
quantitative and qualitative variables. He presents a set of results
demonstrating/
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demonstrating conclusively that subjects judging stimulus sets which
can be quite adequately described in terms of two quantitative dimensions,
in this case width and degree of asymmetry, introduced a third aspect
of variation in that they alto considered the direction of the asymmetry.
This aspect of their performance would have been lost if a two-dimensional
configuration had been obtained and the projection of the stimuli on
each plotted against their order in terms of their physical descriptions.
Even with the third (psychological) dimension there were problems; this
only provided three classes, asymmetric left, symmetric, assymetric
right, and so only in the least restricted sense could it be considered a
dimension in the same sense as the first two.
Torgerson goes on to argue, on the basis of these findings and of those
of others, that similarity is not a unitary concept. He distinguishes between
"... similarity as a basic., perhaps perceptual, relation between instances
of a multidimensional attribute and similarity as a derivative, cognitive
relation between stimuli varying on several attributes." The latter case
he describes as more complex because of its susceptibility to attitude,
attenticnal states and stimulus context, and hence the greater likelihood
of the appearance of qualitative or class variables where it holds. However,
he does not conclude that this invalidates the technique; rather he suggests,
somewhat on the lines of the argument presented above, that the power of
the MDS methods lies in their potential for making plain the structure
underlying a set of similarity judgements, whatever the nature of the stimuli
and hence of the type of similarity relation holding between them.
If/
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It seems reasonable to conclude that this approach to the analysis
of similarity data is both appropriate and powerful if care is taken in its
use, in spite of the lack of strict criteria for the definition of the mono-
tonic relation between similarity and distance and for the specification
of the dimensionality of the final configuration. The most important
point is that this should not be determined by one's expectations but by
the data; if there is any doubt as to whether the solution obtained Is in
error, it can be checked either by re-running the data using different
starting coordinates or by using a different method entirely. The terms
in which the configuration is interpreted will depend to some extent on
t
the nature of the stimulus set, but it is more likely to be profitable to
consider it as representing clusters of similar objects grouped by class
rather than as a representation of the axes of a "psychological space"
along which the perceived members of the stimulus set are organised. This
suggestion is certainly more congruent with the underlying principle, that
degree of perceived similarity is reflected in degree of proximity in the
final configuration.
The approaches to the analysis of similarity data so far considered
have been essentially data reduction techniques. They are concerned with
the development of an algorithm whereby a large set of measures can be
transformed into a more compact and comprehensible form without too
much distortion, and little attention has been paid to their theoretical
basis. By contrast, a number of theoretical and experimental papers have
been/
been produced which are directed at an analysis of MDS from the point
of view of measurement theory (Beals/ Krantz and Tversky, 1968: Tversky
and Krantz, 1969a). The questions of the metric structure of similarity
data and its representation by a spatial model are initially treated
separately. In the former case a description is given of the properties
which must be present ?n a set of dissimilarity (or similarity) data before
it can be considered to embody a metric with additive segments, satisfying
the triangle inequality. The (general) criticisms of the Shepard-Kruskal
approach made by Beals et al are vitiated by their failure to appreciate
the difference in the data set over which a metric is defined; Shepard and
Kruskal deal with a set of distance measures based on an initially randomly-
derived configuration, which is adjusted to conformity with the obtained
similarity measures. These last are used only as a criterion of goodness of
fit; no arithmetical operations are carried out on them. The final configu¬
ration does not represent the metric relations holding between the data points,
but an approximation to these based on the best-fitting set of interpoint
distances that can be achieved in terms of the monotonicity criterion. Thus
the Beals-Krantz-Tversky formulation is dealing with a separate problem
from the Shepard-Kruskal approach and therefore does not constitute a
directly relevant critique of it.
The second part of their argument, the examination of the conditions
under which a spatial representation of similarity data is appropriate, is
treated at greater length. The models presented are based on generalisations
of/
of the Minkowski, or power, metric, where the distance between two
points x = (xj x^) and y = (y^ yj is given by:
( n | ,r) 1Ad(x,y) "(Wm |xj"yfl )
where r is equal to or greater than one. Where r is set equal to two
this equation gives the standard Euclidean metric; where r equals one,
it gives the so-called city block metric, where distance is not measured
directly between two points but is taken as the sum of the distances between
them on each dimension of the space.
Three assumptions are embodied in the general equation for the
Minkowski metric. The first is that the distance between points is a
function of "component-wise contributions." This is called decomposability.
The second, embodying what is described as intradimensional subtractivity,
says that each component-wise contribution is the absolute value of the
scale difference, in other words that the distance between two points is a
function of the difference between them on each dimension. The third
assumption, interdimensional additivity, extends this by stating that the
distance is a function of the sum of these differences. The first assumption
gives the most general model. The latter two can be combined into what
is known as the additive difference model, which is a special case of both
its components. It should be emphasised that the equations embodying these
assumptions do not require that the data to which they might be applied
correspond to any metric. However, if both the metric and dimensional
assumption^
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assumptions are to be satisfied it is shown that the only model which can
accommodate both sets of constraints is the Minkowski metric.
The papers by Beals et al (1968) and Tversky and Krantz (1969) are
devoted almost exclusively to the mathematical analysis of the various
models presented. The derails are not relevant here, but the point of view
underlying their approach, and one of their extra-systematic assumptions,
should be considered. The authors are concerned with MDS models not as
data reduction techniques but as quantitative psychological theories. Their
focus of interest, however, is on whether or not a particular set of data
satisfied the assumption underlying their models, to the extent that it is
suggested that the properties of subtractivity and additivity can be taken
as defining the existence of psychological dimensions. It is also assumed
(the exfra-systerr.atic assumption mentioned above) that a particular
"factorial (i.e. dimensional) characterisation" of the stimuli Is initially
available. It is apparent, therefore, that the criterion for deciding whether
or not a data set can be considered as embodying psychological dimensions
3s the congruence of the configuration representing the data with that
representing the physical structure of the stimulus set. To adopt this point
of view is to distort beyond the limits of normal usage the notion of a
dimension, to overlook the possibility that a dimensional interpretation of
Hie results is not necessarily the most appropriate, and that a class one may
be necessary, and that similarity judgements may not reflect exactly the
physical structure of the stimulus set.
These/
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These comments, however, merely serve to suggest that this
approach needs to be supplemented by theoretical considerations appropriate
to the context when it is applied in a given experimental situation. The
fact that it can be used to indicate where and to what extent perceived
structure deviates from physical structure makes it a powerful normative
model in the sense used earlier. Requiring a preliminary description of
the structure of the stimulus set in terms of the model means that highly
specific predictions can be made, and that the reasons for any failures in
prediction that may occur can be examined in the light of the discrepancies,
thus providing some insight into the subject's processing of the stimuli.
It is this tightening of experimental control that gives this model the
advantage over that of Shepard and Kruskal, particularly in view of the
arbitrary decision criteria associated with the latter.
Before leaving the topic of methods of analysis, a brief account
should be given of an alternative approach. This is the hierarchical
clustering scheme (HCS) presented by Johnson (1967). The object here is
to represent the N(N-l)/2 similarity measures in terms of a hierarchy
ranging from the initial level where each object in the set from which
the data has been derived is taken as forming a cluster including only itself
to the ultimate level where the whole set forms a single cluster. The method
provides a straightforward alternative to MDS techniques for reducing and
clarifying similarity data.
The procedure for deriving an HCS is simple. The second level of
clustering/
75.
clustering (the first# as already stated# is simply that where each object
constitutes a cluster) is defined as consisting of the two objects which are
judged to be more similar, in terms of whatever experimental measure
has been used# than any other pair. The value of the similarity relation
between them is taken as the value of the cluster. The data matrix is
then rewritten with one less row and column# the two subsets of similarity
measures associated with the objects forming the cluster being merged
into one. This is done by retaining the larger value of those between the
clustered objects and all others; thus if A and B form a cluster, and the
similarity measure between A and C is 25 and B and C 20# that between
the cluster A/B and C is taken to be 25. This procedure is repeated
until the final level is reached. The use of maximum values in defining
the clusters ensures that monotone invariant results are obtained. It is
clear that some information is lost in comparison with that obtainable
from MDS techniques# and that the relations between all stimuli are not
brought out to the same extent. Nevertheless the HCS represents a
simple way of bringing out the basic partitions of the stimulus set# as
will be seen.
Having discussed at some length the general apparatus available
for the study of similarity judgements# we now turn to situations where
it has been applied with a view to seeing what factors have been shown
to influence performance. Three topics will be taken up here; the
nature/
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nature of the metric underlying the data, and, related to this, the
different ways in which analysable and unanalysable stimuli are
processed; and whether it is more appropriate to study experimental
findings on a group or individual basis.
There is now a considerable body of evidence (Shepard 1964;
Torgerson 1965; Garner 1970) that analysable and unanalysable, or
homogeneous, stimuli require different metrics for the spatial representation
of similarity judgements based on them. In the latter case, for example,
colour patches, the data correspond quite closely to the Euclidean metric,
where distance is measured directly between two points. However, where
the stimulus figures are composed of distinct attributes this no longer
holds, and the city-block metric, where distance between two points is
measured by taking the mean of the absolute differences between the
points on each dimension, has been shown to give a more accurate account
of the similarity relations. The inference based on this distinction is
that where the measures of similarity conform to the city-block metric,
subjects are analysing stimuli Into their component parts and basing their
responses on a direct combination of the differences. When the Euclidean
metric is more appropriate, however, it is suggested that overall impressions
of similarity, not involving such a decomposition of the stimuli, are being
formed.
The nature of the underlying metric can be assessed either directly
or indirectly. The Shepard-Kruskal MDS model is an example of the
indirect approach; if the interpoint distances derived from one or the
other/
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other provide a better fit to the similarity measures for a configuration
in a given number of dimensions, then it can bo assumed that the data
correspond more closely to that metric. The direct approach involute the
concept of an isosimilarity contour, that is, the locus of all stimuli with
a given level of similarity to the standard (Shepard 1964; see also Beals
et al, 1968). With the Euclidean metric the shape of this locus, or line
joining points of equivalent similarity, is elliptical, but if the city-block
metric holds it becomes a diamond. An example of how data can be
manipulated to bring out information bearing on this is provided in the
Shepard p-aper.
Garner (1970) gives an extended analysis of the analyscble/unanalysable
distinction in the context of a discussion of the nature of the stimulus. He
talks of integrality rather than analysability, contrasting it with separability.
Two dimensions are said to be integral "... if in order for a level on one
dimension to be realised, there must be a dimensional level specified for
the other." A visual stimulus has a brightness, hue, saturation, size and
shape; thus any pair of these dimensions are integral. Two dimensions are
separable, on the other hand, if they can be present independently of each
other. Gamer describes these as idealised, or limiting, definitions, the
reason for this being "... the versatility and adaptability of the organism..."
He reviews much evidence which suggests that stimulus dimensions can be
redefined by subjects, and comes to a conclusion close to the point of view
expressed throughout this chapter, that only by paying more attention
firstly to stimuli and secondly how they are perceived can soundly-based
conclusion^/
conclusions about information processing be reached.
The redefinition of stimuli brings us to our final point, the question
of group or individual analysis of results. Both Shepard (1964) and
Torgerson (1965) found that distinct strategies were being used by subgroups
of their subjects, in the former case to the extent that if the groups had
not been studied separately it would have appeared from the data that a
metric representation of it was simply not possible. Thus although an
analysis of each subject's performance may be redundant, it is nevertheless
necessary to be aware of the possibility of producing misleading results by
assuming that all subjects are treating all stimuli in an equivalent fashion.
The concept of similarity, in the context of information processing
tasks in general and form discrimination in particular, is clearly not
straightforward or easy to handle. Its complexity arises from its vagueness,
and the wide range of objects, situations and processes where if is invoked.
This in turn imposes severe constraints upon any investigation involving
aspects of similarity, since otherwise it is not possible to come to firm
conclusions on the processes involved. The most important thing is to
provide a normative model in the sense of a rigorous, unambiguous and exclusive
description of the stimulus set used. This must be accompanied by a method
of analysis capable of isolating the discrepancies, if any, between the
physical and perceived structures of the stimulus set. Such methods are
available, in particular the Beals-Krantz-Tversky approach. The optimal
stimulus specification would seem tc be in terms of discrete attributes,
varying/
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varying in level, forming what Garner describes as a complete
orthogonal set, that is one where no dimensions of variation are correlated.
Such a description fulfils the criteria laid down above, and at the same
time can be made sufficiently simple to reduce the information overload
on the experimenter. The form psychophysics approach, although rigorous
in its own way, not only does not measure up to *hese requirements but
builds in potentially destructive factors by its acceptance of such concepts
as sampling variability and residua! error.
No mention has so far been made of the empirical questions raieed
at the beginning of this chapter. They are raised as part of the introduction
to the next set of experiments, where the theoretical and methodological
issues raised here will be tested.
Chapter 4
The detection and use of stimulus information in
form discrimination tasks
The work to be described here consists of o number of cross-
sectional studies, by contrast with the longitudinal approach of Experi¬
ment !. in general, we wish to examine in more detail certain aspects
of perceptual functioning in the context of a test of the ideas presented
in the previous chapter. As in the first series of experiments, both
orientation and form discrimination are studied; the objective is a more
precise account of the ability of pre-school, and slightly older, children
to detect and reproduce the structural information present in a stimulus
set. Two more specific points will also be considered; the extent to
which response patterns differ when matching-from-sarnple and pair
comparison designs are used, and the occurrence of asymmetry of response
in relation to the nature of the attributes comprising the stimulus set. In
the former case it is expected that the child's ability to reproduce the
structure of the set will be worse in the pair comparison situation, since
the total set is not available for inspection at any time. This follows from
the findings of Over and Over (1967) and Bryant (1969), that performance
is impaired in young children when successive rather than simultaneous
discriminations are required of them, and the consequent inference that
their memory for stimulus features is poor.
In discussing the asymmetries found in Series 1! and ill of Experiment I,
Woodworth's/
Woodworth's schema-pius-correction was Invoked; it was suggested that
a figure rotated from its "normal" orientation is seen as being in some
sense more complex than is the non-rotated version, and that as a result
the latter is more likely to be matched to the rotated figure than vice
versa. The work of Handel and Garner (1966), on the relationship between
pattern goodness and pattern association, is relevant here. They found that
patterns with a low "goodness" rating, and hence from a larger subset,
had many different associates, whereas those with higher ratings had very
few. Thus a poor pattern can be associated to one with a higher "goodness"
rating, but the converse does not hold. The analogue of this situation in
a form discrimination task is that the unrotated figure represents the good
pattern and the rotated one the poor pattern, and hence that the rotated
figure is more often matched to the former than vice versa. We might
anticipate, therefore, that where orientation is one of the attributes
differentiating figures, asymmetries will be found to a greater extent than
where it is not so used.
The normative model to which the results of these studies are referred is
based for two of the three stimulus sets on that used in an experiment by
Tversky and Krantz (1969b). This was designed as a test of their inter-
dimensional additivity hypothesis, in such a way that departures from
expectations could be accurately pinpointed. Their stimulus set comprised
eight schematic faces, composed of the three attributes of overall shape,
eyes and mouth; each of these had two levels or values (see Fig. VI).
According/
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According to their hypothesis the judged dissimilarity of any pair of these
figures is an increasing function of the sum of the differences between each
figure on each attribute. Three predictions are based on this; that dissimilarity
is constant over all stimulus pairs differing by one, two or three attributes
within the same class; that the dissimilarity increases if new differences
are added, that is, the dissimilarity of a stimulus pair differing in two
respects is less than that of a pair differing in three and greater than that of
a pair differing in one; and that the ordering of pairs differing in two
respects is determined by the ordering of pairs differing ?n one. Thus if
the dissimilarity of figures differing in eyes is less than that of figures
differing in mouth, then the dissimilarity of figures differing in eyes and
overall shape is less than that for figures differing in mouth and overall shape.
The predictions were fulfilled in an experiment requiring numerically-
expressed judgements of similarity. The data for each subject were analysed
individually; with six subjects, four out of the six possible orderingpof
attribute classes were obtained, which would have produced a very muddled
picture if the results had been combined. With this approach, then, quite
specific predictions can be made of the ordering of stimulus pairs in terms of
the judged similarity between them. A similar, although less rigorous analysis
is applicable to that section of the experiment where orientation is the sole
f
distinguishing feature, as will be shown.
V
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A formal model is thus available which provides the kind of stimulus
specification that is required and at the same time allows a number of
different methods of analysis to be applied to the data. Before going on
to describe the experiments proper, however, some attention must be given
to the empirical questions raised in Chapter 3, particularly those concerned
with the nature of the decision rule used in matching stimulus figures and
the extent to which differences can be detected. The third of these questions,
the adequacy with which discriminations are being made, can of course be
answered only in terms of the results of any given experiment. It is clear
from the evidence provided in Chapter 1 and the findings quoted in Chapter 2,
that children around five years of age tend to equate partial and complete
identity. Thus their decision rule, which embodies their notion of what
is meant by "the same as!l, will lead them to call two stimulus figures "the
same" if there is some degree of perceived similarity between them.
Series III of Experiment I also suggested that there are quite tight restrictions
on what constitutes perceived similarity, in that responses indicating this
were very rarely made when pairs of figures differed in more than one respect.
However, this raises the second question, how well children can detect
points of difference. The studies of Vurpillot (1968) and Zaporozhets (1964)
show that children of the same age as the subjects used here have poorly
developed strategies for the scanning and comparison of figures. The inference
is, therefore, that not all differences are picked up. This leads into a
circular problem, in experiments of this nature; does the fact that the
decision criterion for identity corresponds to partial equivalence stem from
the/
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the child's incomplete processing of the stimuli, so that he "thinks" that
two figures are identical because he has not succeeded in identifying any
difference between them, or is the scanning process under the control of
the decision rule so that as soon as sorre degree of equivalence has been
established between the figures, the matching criterion is satisfied and
+•
comparison is discontinued. These alternatives suggest different outcomes
in terms of response pattern. Assume that in the latter case, with stimulus
figures defined by three attributes, the recognition that any two attributes
have the same value in both figures of a pair meets the decision rule
criteria. Thus all pairs of stimuli differing in one attribute would be
responded to as "same", as would all physically identical ones; the remain¬
der would be successfully differentiated., If, however, it is the child's
ability to detect features of difference that is limiting his performance, then
we would expect certain of them to be consistently over-looked or ignored;
certain attribute differences will be discriminable while others will not. The
response pattern here will show those pairs of figures differing by a non-
discriminablo attribute not being distinguished, whereas the remainder will
be. If the Tversky and Krantz ordering hypothesis is correct, responses to
figures differing In two attributes will show a comparable pattern; where the
non-discriminated attribute is one of the two differentiating stimulus pairs,
more confusion errors will be made than where it has the same value on both
stimuli. At the same time, because of the presence of a distinctive attribute
in the former case, fewer errors would be expected than where only the one,
non-detected, attribute marks the difference.
if/
On the assumption of random scanning
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If this argument is correct, we have a prediction which can be
tested out in terms of the dimensional representation of the perceived
structure of the stimulus set. If ail differences up to a certain limit are
ignored, as in the first alternative given above, then the configuration
should show ail rhose figures differing by the value defining this limit to
be clustered together; if one particular difference, by virtue of its being
less discriminabie than the others, is consistently overlooked, then the
stimulus figures can be expected to cluster in pairs defined by the other
two attributes they have in common.
There seems littie point in making any suggestions as to the nature of
the metric underlying the similarity measures. Of the two stimulus sets to
be used here one is composed of separable arrributes and one of integral;
but since we know that children differ from adults in their processing of
material of this nature, it seems reasonable to adopt u wait-and-see policy.
Indeed the child's capacity for redefining stimulus sets may well be so great
that questions of the type of metric to which his judgements correspond
become redundant.
The experimental work is divided into three parts, the same subjects
and material being used in all three. A general description of these is
given, followed by more specific accounts of the hypclheses and findings
for each part.
Subjects:
Five groups of subjects were used, drawn from different nursery and
primary/
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primary schools. Their composition is shown in Table VIII. There were
32 girls and 25 boys, giving a total of 57.
Table VIII
Group N Mean Age Age Range
1 17 6-1 5-3/7-6
II 9 5-4 4-10/5-8
III 8 5-4 5-1/5-7
IV 13 4-10 4-3/5-7
V 10 4-2 3-10/4-8
Subject Groups
Results will be presented for the groups singly and together; the reason
for not amalgamating them from the beginning is that there were considerable
differences between them not only in age but also in social and cultural
background, which might be expected to influence the results. Thus Group I
was drawn from a primary school in a predominantly working-class urban
district, while Groups IV and V came from we 11-equipped city nursery
schools and Groups II and III consisted of children from the kindergarten
class of a rural primary school.
Material:
The stimulus sets used here are shown in Figs. V and VI. The orientation
discrimination/
discrimination problems were designed to provide as much variation as
possible so that the form of analysis used in Experiment i could be
extended. The other two are defined by orthogonal attributes/ that is
no attribute or level of attribute is correlated with any orher. Each mem¬
ber of each of these sets is described in terms common to all. The schematic
faces, taken from Tversky and Krantz (1969b)/ are composed of three
attributes each of which can take one of two values; overall shape
(elongated either horizontally or vertically)/ eyes (filled or blank), mouth
(straight or curved). These attributes are separable according to Garner's
(1970) definition. The circle figures of the third set are defined by two
attributes, each with three values; orientation (upright, rotated 45° right,
rotated 90° right) and angle subtended by gap (2QC, 90°, 180"). The order
of presentation of the three sets was varied over groups.
In view of the wide age range of the subjects used here, there
will be a number who fall in each of the three performance categories
described in Experiment I (Table V). Thus in order to maximise the
number of responses available for the kind of analysis proposed here,
subjecrs were pressed to produce more titan one for each discrimination
problem, in ail the studies reported here, if only one comparison figure
wo3 matched to Hie standard in response to the question "Can you see one
up here that's just the same as this one", the subject was asked "Are there
any other ones just the same as this one", "this one" being the- standard.
Where more then one comparison figure was given as a match following
the first question, the supplementary one was not asked.
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Experiment 11; Orientation discrimination
The purpose of this experiment is to examine in greater detail
the findings of Experiment I, that global features of similarity were
detected and used in orientation discrimination and that the orientation
of the standard figure in relation to the members of the comparison set
was more likely to affect responses than the absolute value of the difference
between the standard and any one comparison figure. The stimulus arrays
used were designed to show this effect as clearly as possible. In view of
the strong position preference found in the previous study for choosing
figures in position 3 and 4 in a six-card linear array, comparison figures
identical to the standard were not placed in these positions in any of the
problems. The method f>f presentation and the instructions were identical
with those used in Series I of Experiment I, with the addition of the
supplementary question where only one match was given.
Results:
The results of Experiment I suggested tha t the systematic use of
global aspects of similarity in an orientation task similar to that used here
was accompanied by an increase in number of multiple responses (MR),
that is responses where more than pne comparison figure was matched to
the standard, and by an increase in number of correct responses. These
increases were in relation to the pattern characteristic of what was described
on Stage A, where few MR were given and number of correct resporses was
low;/
low; this was held to represent the lowest level of ability, where choice
of match to standard was essentially random. Since the focus of this
experiment is on regularities in the use of stimulus information, it is
necessary to establish first whether or not the subjects used here have
passed this initial stage. Clearly number of MR cannot be used as a
criterion, since the study was designed to force these as much as possible.
However, the opportunity was still available for them to be given spontane¬
ously; that is, subjects were free to make more than one match following
either the initial instruction or the supplementary question. These
spontaneous MR will be used here as an index of level of performance.
It should be pointed out that what follows is based on group rather
than individual data. As will be seen, there are insufficient constraints
in the stimulus material used here to permit the kind of unique specification
that was described in the previous chapter; thus a discussion of response
probabilities rather than a classification of subjects is more appropriate.
In addition the identification of change over time, the focus of Experiment I,
?s not at issue here; but nothing is lost by working with group measures since
the kind of pattern we are interested in here can be demonstrated quite
clearly in these terms.
Before turning to the analysis of use of stimulus information the more
basic features of the results should be considered. The data is given in
Table IX. From the figures in the first two columns, it is obvious that
ability/
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ability to make correct discrimination is a function of chronological
age; the oldest group (I) give proportionately more correct results than do
Groups 11/ ill and IV, who in turn are more successful than the youngest.
Group V. The overall drop in proportion of total responses correct compared
with first responses merely indicates fhar when pressed to give more than
one response in a situation where only one is correct, subjects will make
more errors. Nevertheless, the orderings in terms of both first and total
responses are remarkably consistent. The third column, however, shows
that Group III, one of the middle-range groups, make fewer omission errors




















1 97 (72) 125 (49) 92 252 1.7
II 30 (43) 50 (34) 69 145 3.4
III 27 (43) 59 (34) 92 174 7.2
IV 43 m 73 (34) 70 214 1.9
V 22 (31) 38 (25) 49 152 3.3
Total responses and correct responses for each subject grour: Bracketed
figures in first two columns show correct responses as proportions of total,
decimal points omitted. See text for further explanation of third column.
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The figures here represent the total number of correct responses (second
column) as a proportion of the possible total of correct responses; for
each group this latter figure is given by multiplying the possible number
of correct responses for each subject, which is eight, by the number of
subjects in the group. Thus the greater the values in this column, the
smaller the number of occasions in which the subjects of a given group
failed to make the correct match to the standard. Group Ill's success here
would appear to be due to the total number of responses they made. It
can be seen from the last column of Table IX that they made more
spontaneous MR than any other group; but they also made a greater number
of choices, the average for each subject being 22 compared with those for
the other groups of between 15 and 17. The fact that Group III performs
at the same level as Groups II and IV in terms of proportion of first responses
correct indicates that they are not capable of better discrimination as such,
simply that by giving more responses they have increased their chances
of hitting on the correct ones.
The criteria for inclusion in category A, representing the lowest
level of performance, were given in Chapter 2 as less than 25% MR and less
than 25% correct responses. Mere 25% MR is equivalent to 2. In these terms,
therefore, none of these groups can be classified at this level, none of them
fulfilling both requirements (final column and bracketed figures, second
column, Table IX). Thus it can be inferred that although there is doubtless
some noise in the results, they are essentially non-random. It has already
beer/
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been noted that the proportion of total correct responses is artificially
lowered here; the fact that even under these circumstances the performance
of all groups can be classified at a higher level than category A increases
the force of the conclusion that their responses are systematically based.
The extent to which responses consistently reflect stimulus features
can be assessed in the following way. Under the circumstances of this
experiment, perfect performance would require that all subjects in a given
group give the correct match to the standard as their first response, and
reject the suggestion that any other comparison figures were identical to
it. One or two in fact did this. The next level down from this would
involve no errors being made on first response, but a number of additional
responses being offered. Since we are assuming, for the moment, a
steady departure from complete accuracy, these additional responses can
be expected to be to the comparison figure(s) perceived as most similar
to the standard. Thus in terms of group results, as performance drops away
from the optimum level, we would expect frequency of response to reflect
degree of similarity between the standard and comparison figures; and by
examining the order of the members of the comparison set, the order being
defined in terms of the frequency with which they are chosen as a match to
the standard, we can see directly what the degree of perceived similarity
is between them and the standard. As far as first responses are concerned,
it would be expected that where these were not all correct, the alternatives
chosep/
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chosen would reflect the order of perceived similarity between figures
in the same way; and to the extent that responses reflect a systematic
but not perfectly accurate use of stimulus information, we would expect
the order of first responses to be identical to that of total responses.
Table X gives this information for all groups combined. St shows
the order of frequency of response to each comparison figure for each
problem, for both total and first responses (the latter in right-hand columns),
the numbers In the body of the table being card positions. Thus for problem 1,
the largest proportion of the total number of responses is made to the figure
in position 1, which is the correct response; the next largest proportion of
responses is to the figure in position 3, the next to that in position 5, and
the next to those in positions 4 and 6 jointly.
Table X
Problem
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1* 3 5* 5 6* 6 2* 2 5* 5 1* 1 6* 6 2* 2
3 i 1 X 2 2 3 3 2,3 3 5 5 3 3 5 3
5 3 3 3 6 6 6 2 3 3 1 3 5
4,6 6 1 5 1 6 4 6 6
4 4
1 2
77 93 72 87 73 91 70 82 91 89 85 83 87 88 90 87
{■
Similarity ordering of comparison sets in terms of frequency
of response, totalled overall subject groups, for all problems.
See text for full description.
Thuv^
Thus the further down the column a figure Is, the less similar to the
standard it can be taken to be. The asterisks indicate the correct matches
to the standard; only in one instance, first responses to problem I, is this
not the figure with the highest frequency of response. Numbers on the
same line indicate equal frequency of response to the comparison figures
in those positions, for example, 4 and 6, problem I. Where comparison
figures do not appear in a column, this indicates that less than 5% of the
number of responses was made to it. The numbers at the foot of each column
indicate the percentage of total number of responses made to the stimulus
figures displayed in the positions given above the line in each column;
for example, taking first responses to problem I, 93% of these were made
to positions 1 and 3, the remaining 7% being distributed over the other
four positions.
In terms of the assumptions laid down previously, we are looking for
congruence between the orders for first and total choices for each problem.
In three cases, problems 1, 6 and 8, this does not hold, but in each the
deviation consists of the reversal of two positions in one order relative to the
other. Problem 5 at first sight may appear to represent another violation of
this requirement, but the fact that figures in positions 2 and 3 are unordered
with respect to each other in terms of total number of responses allows the
two orders to be taken as equivalent. Thus even where results from groups of
mixed ability are combined, considerable regularity of response is demonstrated.
The results presented in Table IX indicate that the older the subjects
W
in a group, the better is that group** performance. A similar, although
not identical, impression is obtained from the breakdown of Table X into








See text for explanation.
Column I gives the number of violations of order consistency over the
eight problems, while column 2 shows the number of times the correct
match to the standard does not show the highest frequency of response. The
possible maximum here is 16, there being two orders for each problem.
Group I are clearly the most accurate, in that correct responses are in all
problems made more frequently than incorrect ones, and also the most
consistent. Of the three middle-range groups, Group III is marginally
superior to Groups II and IV in both respects, confirming the notion suggested
by their low number of omission errors that in spite of the number of responses
they gave, greater than that of any other group, they were ?n fact operating
under greater systematic constraints than either of their peer groups inasmuch
as/
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as the distribution of their responses is more restricted. Group V can be
seen to be less accurate than any of the others, but no less consistent than
two of the older groups.
So far what has been said has been intended to demonstrate that
the results are not random and so that it is legitimate to take frequency
of response to a member of the comparison set as an indlx of the perceived
similarity between it and the standard. We now turn to an examination of
the stimulus figures in order to see what kinds of features responses are
based on. This will be done for each problem individually.
First responses to problem I (Table X) show quite clearly that the
two horizontally-oriented figures with the opening of the "hook" upwards
are the most obvious first choices. However, the incorrect response is
given more often than the correct one. This raises the question of a position
bias, similar to that found in Experiment I; this possibility will be considered
in more detail at a later stage. Be this as It may, no other figures are
initially considered to be the same as the standard. Moving to the order of
total responses, the correct choice can be seen to be more frequently made.
The same two figures still occupy the first two places in the order, and the
third most frequent response is to the only other horizontal figure in the
array. The two oblique figures complete the distribution. What was
described as an "obvious mis-match" in Experiment I, here represented by
the vertically-oriented figure in position 2, is not confused with the standard
at/
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at all. Here, therefore, the order of similarity is horizontal figures,
obliques and vertical figures, with the last mentioned only for the sake
of completeness. In addition to the possible influence of a position
preference effect, the role of distinctive features should be considered.
In both oblique figures the "hook" is on the same, left, side of the card
as it is on the standard figure. This question also will be raised again
at a later point.
In all remaining problems the correct match to the standard is
the most frequently chosen; comments will therefore be restricted to the
order of similarity. In problem 2 the most similar non-identical figure
to the standard is the 90° rotation in position 1. The two other oblique
figures in the array are next, while the non-oblique ones are virtually
never chosen. The vertical figures in problem 3, corresponding to the
orientation of the standard, occupy the first three places in both orders.
Following the correct match, the next similar figure is the one which
represents a rotation of the standard about its vertical axis in the third
dimension, so that the larger part of the figure is still at the fop. The third
vertical figure does not preserve this relation, and is perceived as less
similar to the standard. Here the horizontally-oriented figure does not
appear in the order.
Problem 4 indicates the influence of distinctive features. All
members of the comparison set are obliquely oriented, but the two which
have the double lines at the bottom end in contrast to the top end, as -5n
the/
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the standard, are seen as least similar to it, with the figure in the same
orientation as the standard being last in the similarity order. The shape
chosen for problem 5 can be described in Wohlwil! and Winer's term as
having "low directionality"; nevertheless, here again there is consistency,
with the two vertical figures not being described to any extent as similar
to the standard. The frequency of choice of the figure in position 3, and
its consequent appearance in one order above the other horizontal figure
and in the other as tied with it may well be a position effect. In problem 6
the total response order is nicely consistent with what one would hope to
find; the oblique figure in the same orientation as the standard is seen as
more similar to it than the other two obliques in the opposite orientation,
while the vertical and horizontal figures are least similar. This does not
appear in the first response order, however, where the vertical figure
appears above one of the obliques. The two vertical figures in problem 8
account for by far the largest proportion of responses, with one of the
oblique figures, rotated 45° from the orientation of the standard, being
chosen a few times only.
Finally, the total response order for problen 8, like that for
problem 6, is very neat; it is headed by the two bottom-heavy horizontally-
oriented figures, followed by the two top-heavy ones; the obliques are rarely
chosen.
Before going on to discuss these findings, some attention should be
given to the question of the presence of a position preference or bias effect.
Table/
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1 19 21 17 22 16 11 4 7 20 24 23 23
II 12 15 15 15 26 26 11 12 19 19 16 15
III 16 15 17 15 20 27 3 3 21 19 22 20
IV 17 16 15 18 22 27 5 4 21 22 20 14
V 15 18 22 19 26 35 12 6 16 10 19 12
Proportion of responses to each position in the comparison array
(decimal points omitted), taken over all problems for each subject group.
Left-hand columns, total responses: right-hand columns, first responses.
If performance were completely accurate, 25% of first responses would
be made to figures in positions 1, 2, 5 and 6, since the correct choice
appeared twice at each of these positions over the eight problems, and
there would be no responses to positions 3 and 4. As can be seen, Group I
approximates most closely to this. The remaining groups give a greater
proportion of their responses to position 3, and this increases as the mean
age of the group decreases; at the same time responses to position 4 are,
with the exception of Group II, uniformly low, and even Group II make
less than half the number of responses to position 4 that they give to position 3.
The/
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The fact that responses to position 3 are proportionately greater in the
younger, and hence, as has been seen, less accurate and less systematic,
groups suggest that there is some bias in the overall results, but the low
level of response to position 4 also indicates that the distributions do not
reflect this alone.
Conclusions;
As would be expected, accuracy of response in terms of both
correct responses and omission errors increases with age. However, we
have also seen that responses are more systematic with older subjects, ?n
that they are more likely to detect the correct match to the standard
initially and to show consistency in their non-correct judgements. The
relationship between extent to which responses reflect gross features of
similarity, number of correct responses, and number of multiple responses,
brought out in the longitudinal study reported in Chapter 2, has been shown
to hold under the modified circumstances of this experiment; and it has
also been shown that the better the performance in terms of the classification
scheme described earlier, the less likely it is to be based on factors other
than stimulus information.
The analysis of the kinds of confusion most likely to appear in
problems of this kind confirms that it is not the absolute nature of the
difference between the standard and the comparison figures which is relevant,
but rather the relationship between them; in problem I, for instance, a
90°/
90° rotation of the standard was virtually never confused with it, whereas
this was the most common error in problem 2. The similarity orderings
suggest that it is possible for children of this age to respond differentially
to obliquely-oriented figures in different orientations, but only when
asymmetrical figures are presented so that the contrast between the two
orientations becomes apparent; otherwise they will respond to oblique
figures as such, regardless of orientation.
However, these results also suggest that orientation, at least
with the stimulus figures used here, is not the sole determinant of
response. The presence of a feature in a figure which can be used to
differentiate between its presentations, for examp'e, the "hook" or
problem 1 and the "prongs" of problem 4, can also provide information
which may be used. And the data presented in Table XII suggest that for
younger children there is an interaction between position in the array and degree
of similarity to the standard. Thus It could be suggested that the frequency
with which figures in position 3 were responded to reflects the fact that
this was the first position looked at, and that the figures at that position
were more often than not at least to some extent similar to the standard,
more so certainly than was the case with position 4. However, a record
of eye-movements would be required for a proper test of tfifs hypothesis.
The results can therefore be taken as indicating that relational
fectures in the stimulus set are detected in an orientation discrimination
task , that these are reflected in subject's responses, but that the features
used/
used and the extent to which Irrelevant (to the experimenter) factors
determine responses depend very much on the nature of the figures used
as stimuli. Garner's comment about the subject's ability to redefine the stimu¬
lus is perhaps the most relevant one for this kind of task/ where whatever
Information is available may be used and even some that is not.
Experiment III: Form discrimination
This study explores the obility of children to detect and use,
in a matching task, information defining stimulus sets the members of
which vary in respect of more than one attribute. With the two sets
used here (Fig. VI), the relationship of each stimulus figure to every
other can be completely specified in terms of the attribute structure of
the set. The formal description of the structure, together with the
ordering hypotheses mentioned earlier in this chapter, provide the normative
mode! in terms of which subjects' performance is assessed. There are
three classes of difference between figures for the schematic faces (set 1); ((*■ &1)
since these vary in three attributes, each of which can take one of two
levels, the differences can be in one, two, or three attributes. With the
circle figures (set 2), however, there are five classes, since the figures
are composed of two attributes each of which can take three values. The
classes of distinct figures are; one attribute constant, the other differing
by one or by two levels; both attributes differing, by one or by two levels;
and one attribute differing by one level, the other by two.
Experimental procedure here was identical to that used in Series II
and I!!, Experiment I, a duplicate of each figure in the set being placed in
the centre of the bottom row (set 1) or below the array (set 2). Where every
member of the set is compared with the whole in this way, conclusions
on the processes involved are based on subjects' perception of the structure
v/ithin the set, assessed by a series of converging operations, rather than on
generalisations/
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generalisations across results from different sets as in the previous
experiment. By speaking of "converging operations" here it is
intended to emphasise the fact that subjects have the opportunity to
define equivalent subsets in several different ways. For example,
suppose that a subject indicates that figures A, B and C in the array
are the same as the standard figure A. If with B as standard he makes
the same three choices, then it can be inferred with a greater degree of
certainty that these three figures are not differentiated as far as he is
concerned than would be the case if only one set of results were obtained.
Thus the investigation of the detection of structural relations is more

















1 82 (60) 128 (40) 94 319 3.8
II 38 (53) 57 (42) 79 135 2.7
III 25 (39) 50 (31) 78 164 5.8
IV 48 (46) 86 (33) 83 262 3.5
V 19 (24) 51 (27) 64 191 5.0
Correct responses, etc. for all groups in set 1 (faces. Format as for Table IX
Results:/
Resuib:
The findings from the two stimulus seb will be discussed
separately, and then brought together in the analysis of the asymmetry
data. Table XIII gives the basic resuib obtained from Hie schematic
faces. On the same criteria as used in Experiment 2, it is clear
that responses can be taken to be non-random, since no group show a
level of performance corresponding to that of category A. The corre¬
lation between age and accuracy is still apparent here, although it is
less definite than in the previous study. The proportions of total
correct responses are low, but this can be attributed as much to the
large number of responses made by oil groups as to any other factor.
The third column, indicating omission errors, gives a more tidy picture;
the age trend is more clearly defined, and the overall accuracy of
matching can be seen to be higher than consideration of the first two
columns only would suggest.
The focus of interest, however, is less on how accurately children
can discriminate these figures than on how their incorrect matching






1 attribute 2 attributes 3 attributes
I 73 (79) 25 (21) 2 (0)
II 81 (88) 19 02) 0 (0)
III 71 (90) 28 (10) 1 (0)
IV 67 (73) 30 (25) 3 (2)
V 62 (57) 34 (41) 4 (2)
Left-hand columns, proportion of wrong responses made to
comparison figures differing from standard in 1, 2 ar 3 attri¬
butes. Right-hand columns proportion of wrong first responses
involving each degree of difference.
in terms of the distribution of erroneous responses to figures differing
from the standard as a proportion of the total number of responses, and
of wrong first responses as a proportion of the possible total of first
responses. To invert one of the Tversky-Krantz ordering hypotheses, it
is quite clear that as the similarity between pairs of stimuli, in terms of
attributes in common, increases, the number of confusions increases also.
Taking Group I as an example, 60% of their first responses were correct
(Table XIII); almost 80% of their wrong first responses involved judging
a figure differing from the standard by only one attribute to be the same
as it. With the possible exception of Group V, in all cases a much smaller
number of errors involve figures differing by more than one attribute from
the standard; even for Group V the difference is in the right direction.
Owing/
Owing to lack of computer facilities, it was possible to carry
out an MDS analysis on only two sets of data, for Groups I and IV;
and only that for Group I used both the Euclidean and City biock
metrics. The same program was used as in Experiment I. Virtually
no difference was found in the adequacy with which each metric
represented the data, in terms of the departure from monotonicity of
the function relating distance in the configuration to {udged similarity













Values of Delta (index of departure from mono¬
tonicity} for Group I data using different metrics.
In both coses a four-dimensional solution gives the best fit to the data,
but there are no real differences between the values of Delta. This
suggests that either a mixed strategy is being used by the subjects, or
that different approaches to the stimuli are being taken by subgroups,
some of whom will be treating them as analysable and so giving results
more/
more appropriately handled by the city block metric, and others
responding in more global terms, forming overall impressions,
which would produce a similarity ordering more congruent with the
Euclidean distance measure.
The three-dimensional configuration for both analyses of the
Group I data are shown in Fig. VII. This means of representation
was chosen rather than that provided by two two-dimensional plots
in order to bring out groupings of figures in contrast to their projections
along dimensions. With both metrics, the groupings shown in three
dimensions are preserved in the fourth; the latter does not introduce
a greater separation between members of a group than is apparent
in the plot given. The basic division of the stimulus set is between
figures i, 3, 5~and 8, which fall in the top half of the configuration,
and 2, 4, 6 and 7, in the bottom half. This corresponds to the distinction
between figures with a vertically-elongated overall shape and a hori¬
zontal one, respectively. Within this division the figures are separated
in terms of whether or not the eyes are the same. This is particularly
apparent for the Euclidean configuration, where 1 and 5, 3 and 8, 2 and 4,
and 6 and 7 form quite distinct clusters. Thus it can be inferred that
figures differing oniy in the shape cf the mouth are more likely to be
confused than any others, and that values of the other two attributes
are more frequently detected and used.
The way the figures are clustered can also be made more obvious by
using/
using the hierarchical clustering scheme described in the previous
chapter. Fig. VllUhaws the hierarchies for all five groups. Wirh
the sole exception of that for Group IV these all show the first four
clusters to be of the pairs of figures differing only in the shape of the
mouth, again demonstrating that this is the attribute most likely to be
ignored when describing the similarity between figures. Clusters beyond
this are of two distinct kinds; that for Group IV brings together the
two clusters which have the same type of eyes, showing that this is a
more powerful determinant of similarity than overall shape, while Groups
II, ill and V bring together the sub-clusters composed of figure with the
same overall shape; for these subjects, then, this is a more potent
criterion of similarity than the eyes. Group ! show a more mixed
pattern. The fifth cluster brings together two of the lower-level
clusters with the same type of eyes, but the sixth does not unite the
other two; here the fifth is combined with the first, to form a cluster
with two figures with the same overall shape as two of the four others
but otherwise distinct from them. This loss of regularity and the resulting
complexity of the similarity relations among the whole set of stimulus
pairs was reflected in the MDS analysis, in the number of dimensions
required to represent the dcta adequately.
The results described so far indicate quite clearly that where
matching responses are incorrect they are nevertheless systematic, in
that frequency of errors decreases considerably where the difference between
figured
no.
figures is marked by mare than one attribute. We now turn to the second
ordering hypothesis mentioned earlier, that the order of similarity for
pairs of figures differing in two attribules is determined by the order of
pairs differing in one. This can be done for both group and individual
data, in a similar way. The order of similarity is given by the number
of confusion errors involving figures differing by a given amount; the
more errors there are, the more similar the figures are seen to be.
Table XVI shows the six possible orders which can be derived from this
stimulus material; the "Total" column, giving the frequency of occurrence
of each order, indicates that they are not all equally present, and that
by far the greatest number of confusion errors involve figures differing
in mouth. The fact that the sum of the entries here is less than the number







M: E: S ME: MS: ES 20
M: S: E MS: ME: ES 12
E: S: M ES: ME: MS 5
E: M: S ME: ES: MS 4
S: E: M ES: MS: ME 4
S: M: E MS: ES: MS 3
List of ail possible orders of stimuli differing on one and two
attributes. stands for "are more similar than;" e.g. in
row 1, figures differing in M(outh) only are more similar than
figures differing in E(yes) only, etc. "Total" column gives no.
of subiects producing responses wholly or partially corr. to each order.
Where responses are consistent with the ordering hypothesis, the order
defined by the confusion errors for each subject will correspond to one
of these. For example, if a subject confuses figures which differ in
mouth only more frequently than figures differing in eyes only, arid
matches still fewer figures differing in overall shape only, then he
should make more errors wirh figures which differ in mouth and eyes,
fewer where mouth and shape differ, and virtually none where eyes and
shape differ (first row, Table XVI). The extent to which such consistency









1 10 1 6 .006
II 2 2 5 .673
III 6 0 2 .016
IV 7 3 3 .172
V 8 1 1 .020
Total 33 7 17 .00005
Number of consistent and inconsistent orders for each
group. P values from binomial test.
The "not relevant" column gives the number of subjects to v/hose
responses the hypothesis could not be applied, either because they made
only/
oniy one or two errors, if any, or because their errors involved only
figures differing in one attribute. This latter group accounts for the
discrepancy between the sums of these frequencies and those given in
the third column of Table XVI. These subjects show a high level of
performance in that they resist the suggestion that any of the non-
identical figures are the same as the standard, or eise restrict their
errors to figures differing minimally, that is by one attribute only.
The p values are derived from the application of the binomial test to
the distribution of consistent and inconsistent orders, omitting the
irrelevant sets of results. Although the individual groups show wide
variations in the level of significance associated with the relative
frequency of occurrence of the two types of order, there can be no
doubt that distribution of type of similarity order for all groups is non-
random .
The first of the Tversky-Krantz hypotheses, that dissimilarity is
constant over all stimulus pairs differing by one, two or three attributes
when the remainder have the same value, cannot be tested fully in the
type of situation used here where an absolute judgement of each stimulus
pair is required of the subject and observations are not repeated. The
other two hypotheses have, however, been shown to hold; as the number
of points of difference between two figures increases, the probability that
they/
they will not be judged to be the same also increases/ and the order of
similarity of figure pairs differing in one attribute has been shown ct a
high level of significance to determine the order of similarity of figures
differing in two. It has also been seen (Table XVI) that not all attributes
are equally discriminable for all subjects. Although there is a strong
tendency for the shape of the mouth to be disregarded as a differentiating
attribute by most subjects, this is by no means true for all of them.
Turning now to the analysis of results from set 2 (circle figures),


















1 119 (78) 139 (54) 91 256 91
II 40 (50) 57 (39) 70 146 70
III 19 (26) 51 (29) 71 176 71
IV 57 (49) 76 (35) 65 220 65
V 17 09) 46 (24) 51 192 51
Correct responses, etc. for all groups or. set 2 (circles) Format
as for Table IX.
Again the number of omission errors (third column) brings out most
clearly the relationship between age and accuracy of response, with the oldest
group/
group showing almost complete success and the youngest only giving
50% correct responses. As with set 1, Group 3 give a large number
of responses end consequently compare badly with their peers in
terms of proportion of responses correct. The overall level of
performance is clearly beyond that of category A, and can therefore
be taken as reflecting at best some of the regularity provided by the
attributes comprising the stimulus set. This can be seen in more
detaii in Table XIX, which shows that figures differing even by one
level on the attribute of shape are very much iess likely to be confused





1 2 1 2 Sl°l Sl°2 S2°l S2°2
1 52 (53) 15 (15) 17 (30) 3 11 0) 3 1 0
II 53 (61) 20 (17) 17 (20) 1 8 (2) 1 0 0
III 48 (51) 25 (23) 7 (4) 4 8 (9) 3 3 1
IV 40 (50) 13 (13) 12 (17) 3 22(13) 6 4 1
V ! 34 (30) 12 (11) 16 05) 5 12(11) 7 8 5
Distribution of wrong responses on set 2. Format as for Table IX.
The iack of success with which orientation differences are detected is
sti11/
still more apparent In Table XX, which corrects for differences In the
number of pairs of figures in each of the five classes differentiated by
combination of attribute and level. The first row of the table gives
the number of stimulus pairs differing to a given degree; the figures in
the body of the table represent the number of incorrect responses given
to each class of distinct figures as a proportion of the possible total of
such responses. The latter figure is arrived at by doubling the number
of stimulus pairs in each class and multiplying the result by the number
of subjects in each group. The initial doubling of number of stimulus
pairs is required by the fact that every member of the stimulus set is
matched with every other, so that subjects have the opportunity not only




1 2 1 2 Sl°l Sl°2 S2°l S2°2
^o.of prs,
in each 6 3 6 3 8 4 4 2
class
1 30 17 10 3 5 2 1 0
II 44 34 14 4 5 1 0 0
III 60 62 9 5 8 3 3 3
IV 36 25 11 5 13 8 5 4
V 41 30 20 7 11 14 15 13
Number of incorrect judgements of stimulus pairs of each degree of
difference as proportion of maximum possible number of such confusions.
The extent to which orientation is ignored in making similarity
judgements in comparison with shape ?s much more clearly brought out
here. For all groups, proportionately fewer errors are made with figures
differing only by one level of shape than are made with figures differing
in two levels of orientation. In both classes of figures differing in
only one attribute the hypothesis that judged similarity reflects degree
of difference is upheld; in only one case (Group III, orientation) is a
greater proportion of errors made with figures differing by two levels
than by one, and the discrepancy is small. Errors where both attributes
vary are uniformly low; it is only here that differences in type of error
among groups becomes clear, in that Groups IV and V give a larger
proportion of their responses to these more obviously distinct figure pairs.
The group results accurately reflect the data produced by individual
subjects; no violations of the ordering hypothesis were produced.
Again an MDS analysis is presented only for Group I. Table XXI
shows that the Euclidean metric gives a slightly more accurate configuration,
but the differences are not so great that it would be legitimate to exclude




Euclidean .003 .002 .0003
City block .004 .004 .002
Values of Delta for different metrics,
Group I data.
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However, since the values of Delta indicate that the distances in the
Euclidean configuration fit the similarity ordering marginally better,
it seems more appropriate to decide in favour of it. Nevertheless
this finding ?s in line with the suggestion that the Euclidean metric is
more appropriately used where stimuli are composed of integral
attributes, as here. In view of the minimal difference between the
goodness of fit of the two- and three-dimensional configurations, the
former are shown in Fig. IX. That based on the Euclidean metric gives
a much closer approximation to the attribute structure of the total set
in its regularity, while the other, with the figures clustered in terms of
their shape, corresponds more to the suggestion based on the previous
; I
analysis that orientation is less likely to be used in discriminating between
-, *
figures. However, even with the Euclidean metric the pairs of figures
differing in orientation are in general more widely separated than those
differing in shape. Thus again it is evident that the structure of the
stimulus set is being taken account of by the subjects.
The HCS for all groups are given in Fig. X. It is interesting that
with the exception of Group V, who have consistently shown less accuracy
and systematic use of attribute structure than any other group in the results
reported up to this point, none of the hierarchies show the three sets of
figures differing in orientation only being brought together before clusters
involving figures differing in shape. This may well reflect the small number
of errors made by the older groups with figure pairs differing in more than
one/
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one attribute. As an HCS Is built up, the larger entries in the similarity
matrix are used first and the higher-level clusterings, which reflect a
lower degree of similarity, are frequently based on a relatively small
number of confusions. Thus where errors are few and confined to a
limited subset of figure pairs, as with the older groups here, the information
on which the higher levels of the HCS are based may well be unreliable.
This finding does show, in a striking way, the reflection of stimulus
structure in responses; although Group V gave only half the possible
number of correct responses, their errors are quite evidently not random.
One common feature of the HCS for all groups is that stimulus
figures 3, 4 and 8, the three with the smallest size of gap, cluster
together at an early stage, and with the exception of Group III, are not
linked with any other figures until the final cluster, where the whole set
is merged. This indicates that these three figures form a more discriminable
subset than any of the others, the two sets of figures with larger gaps being
(relatively) more confusing.
It was suggested in the introductory section of this chapter that more
asymmetries would be found with set 2 than with set 1, on the grounds
that orientation would be utilised in a way distinct from other attributes
and that figures in a particular orientation would have matches made to
them more frequently than they would be matched to other figures. This
was not the case. A few asymmetries occurred in the results for individual
groups, but the response totals involved were too small to accept them as
reliable;/
reliable; nor was there any consistency across groups in the asymmetries
found. Combining data for all groups produced five asymmetries for
set 1 and four for set 2, with asymmetry being defined as at least twice
as many matches being made of A to B as of B to A. These are shown
in Table XXII.
Table XXII
Set i Set 2
1* 6 1* 6
7* 1 7* 1




Asymmetries. stands for "Is matched more often to."
As can be seen, there are no consistencies here; the hypothesis therefore
remains open to further test.
Conclusions:
Accuracy and consistency of response has again been shown to be
a function of age, with younger subjects making more omission errors,
giving proportionately less correct responses, and making more confusions
between figures differing in more than one attribute. The major aspect of
the/
the study, however, the use of a normative model to specify the
stimulus sets in such a way that the nature of errors con be accurately
defined, has been amply justified. The extent to which response
patterns have been shown to reflect stimulus structure, using different
methods of analysis, indicates that similarity judgements in children
are more systematic than has hitherto been realised. The results show
that even at four years of age children are capable of detecting and using
informetion about the structure of the total stimulus set, when this is
available to them, in a regular fashion. We are now able to suggest an
answer to the question raised in the first part of this chapter, on the nature
of the decision rule used by subjects in allotting figures to rhe match/
mismatch categories. It was suggested there that if the decision criteria
operated in terms of a particular level of similarity, for example any
two attributes "n common between two figures being enough to define
them as identical, then all pairs differing by more than the amount specified
would be discriminated, but no others would. The alternative possibility
suggested was that certain attributes would be less discriminable than others
and that therefore, for a given level of physical similarity, the difference
between some pairs of figures would be detected but would not for others.
It has been found that certain differences are more likely to be ignored
than others, for both stimulus sets used here. The conclusion is therefore
that performance is limited by ability to detect features of difference, rather
than the application of a deviant notion of what is implied by "the same as."
The/
The fact that certain attributes were consistently ignored here
makes the question of the integrality or separability of the stimuli
redundant. However they may be conceptualised as entities in them¬
selves, the subjects* redefinition of them is going to nullify any
descriptive efforts along these lines. Thus the question of the appropriate
metric for the analysis of such data, where the interpretation of the
stimulus set from which it is derived can be shown to deviate from the
intended structure, as suggested earlier also becomes somewhat of an
academic exercise. There was some indication that the Euclidean metric
was more appropriate for the set 2 data, as would have been expected;
but why this should be so when one attribute was so consistently over¬
looked is not clear.
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Experiment IV: Form discrimination using pair comparison presentation
This study was intended to show what differences, if any, a
different form of presentation of the figures to be discriminated would
make to the findings. The material of set 1 (schematic faces) was used
in a poir comparison task. All p-airs of figures were presented to the
subjects, one at a time; the instructions simply took the form of a
question; "Is this (point to one stimulus) the same as this?" (point to
other). As far as was possible the position of each figure, to the left
or right, was equated over its appearances. Order of presentation of
pairs was random. There were 28 distinct pairs and 8 identical ones.
Twenty subjects were used in all, ten from Group IV and the ten of
Group V. The task was administered to all subjects some weeks after
they had completed Experiment III.
No subiect failed to describe a physically identical pair of
figures as being the same. Immediately there is a considerable difference
from the findings of Experiment III, where both of these groups made a
number of omission errors. Two possible reasons could be advanced for
the discrepancy. By presenting figures two at a time the child's attention
is being focussed sharply on the relevant aspects of the situation; the
distraction provided by a large comparison array, with the possibility
that poor scanning will result in his literally not seeing the correct match,
is eliminated. Also the form of question used, where rhe child has the
difficulr/
k
difficult task of saying "No" if he is to be correct on most trials,
may have produced a response bias which had little to do with the
stimulus as such.
Although both of these contaminating factors may have been
operating, they cannot account for the distribution of errors. This is





i attribute 2 attributes 3 attributes
S E M SE SM EM SEM
IV 11 17 14 (39) 18 15 20 (49) 14 (12) 109
V 15 26 24 (39) 27 25 23 (47) 20 (14) 160
Distribution of errors in pair comparison task. Bracketed figures,
number of errors in each class as proportion of total number of errors.
The consistency found in the previous experiment has vanished; a
greater proportion of errors is made with stimulus pairs differing in two
attributes than with those differing in one, and a far greater proportion
of three-attribute differences between figures result in errors. The order
of errors for figures differing in two attributes follows that for one-attribute
differences for Group IV, just, but not for Group V or the two combined.
Thus/
Thus it appears that these subjects have answered "No" almost at
random; certainly the pattern of response is very much less systematic
than would have been anticipated on the basis of the findings from the
last experiment.
This is shown again in Fig. XI, in the HCS for the two groups.
The initial clusters differ in either two or three attributes; the regular
partitioning of the stimulus set along the lines given by its structure,
observed in Experiment 2, has been quite lost, as can be seen by a
comparison of Fig. X| and Fig. XVIII.
The contrast between these findings and those of Experiment III
indicates beyond doubt that only when the whole stimulus set is available
to the child will his responses reflect its structure. Had this experiment
been carried out in isolation it would have been legitimate to suggest not
only this was not possible for children of this age, but that there was some
doubt as to whether they were capable of comprehending and using the
notion of "same as." Context effects are well known in psychology; but
the magnitude of the effect that the context of the total set can have in a
form discrimination task of this nature is surprising, to say the least.
Chapter 5
Concluding comments
The studies reported here have been exploratory in nature,
designed to answer questions of the "what-happens-if? " variety.
Putting the results of the longitudinal and cross-sectional experiments
together, the picture of the development of form discrimination
skills which emerges is close to that described by E.J. Gibson.
Improvement in performance does reflect an increasing awareness of
stimulus features and a more refined use of them. The developmental
process is not straightforward, however. Starting from a level where
responses reflect situational rather than stimulus factors, which is to
a large extent defined by the complexity of the problems presented,
the child moves on to a stage where it is necessary for him to match a
number of comparison figures to the standard because he is not yet
capable of detecting all the features which define the single correct
response. This is the final level of competence. V/e have seen that it
is failure to pick up relevant information that is responsible for the
intermediate stage, rather than the use of a criterion of partial identity
between figures in coming to the match/mismatch decision, from the
fact that stimulus figures differing by the same number of attributes are
not confused to the same extent. In addition, the homomorphism shown
be tween/
between the structure available in the stimulus set and that of responses
indicates a systematic misuse of information which cannot be accounted
for simply in terms of detection of partial identity as such.
These comments only apply to results derived from a matching-
from-sample task. When pair comparison presentation is used the
stimulus structure is no longer detected, and although the probability
that fully identical figure pairs will be correctly responded to increases
markedly, errors become random. It is quite likely that the use of a
discrimination learning paradigm would bring about an awareness of the
stimulus structure; but the point here is simply that with a matching
task the whole stimulus set has to be made available if we wish to study
the child's ability to detect regularity.
Perhaps the major implication of the findings reported here is that
the nature of the stimulus has to be considered with some care before the
use to which the subject puts it can be adequately discussed. This is less
important if all that is required is information on how well different
figures are differentiated under particular circumstances; but the field
of investigation must be expanded and made more rigorous, by the use
of an appropriate normative model, if we are to be able to go beyond this
and discuss strategies and processes underlying performance. Here a
complete specification of the structure of the stimulus set is essential;
without the baseline provided by such a description, it is not possible to
analyse/
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analyse errors systematically and see how they relate to the defined differences
among the members of the set, especially since children are so ready to
redefine the stimuli presented to them. But when these factors are taken
into consideration, much more can be said about how the child goes
about detecting regularity, order and structure^how well he can do this
in the context of form discrimination experiments, and what kinds of skills
he brings to the task.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Attneave, F. and Arnoult, M.D. (1956) The quantitative study of
shape and pattern perception. Fsychol. Bull. 53, 452 - 471.
Beals, R., Krantz, D.H. and Tversky, A. (1968) Foundations of
multidimensional scaling. Psychol. Rev. 75, 127 - 142.
Birch, H.G. and Lefford, A. (1967) Visual Differentiation, Intersensory.
Integration and Voluntary Motor Control. Lafayette, Society for
Research in Child Development, Mon. vol. 32, No. 2.
Braine, L.G. (1965) Age change in mode of perceiving geometric
forms. Psychonom. Science, 2, 155 - 156.
Behrman, B.W. and Brown, D.R. (1968) Multidimensional scaling
of form; a psychophysical analysis. Perception and Psycho -
physics, 4, 19 - 25.
Brown, D.R. and Andrews, M.H. (1968) Visual form discrimination:
multidimensional analyses. Perception and Psychophysics, 3,
401 - 406.
Brown, D.R. and Goldstein, J.A. (1967) Stimulus correlates of the
discrimination behaviour of children. Psychonom. Science, 9,
177 - 178.
Brown, D.R. and Owen, D.H. (1967) The metrics of visual form;
Methodological Dyspepsia. Fsychol. Bull. 68, 243 - 259.
Bryant, P. E. (1969) Perception and memory of the orientation of
visually presented stimuli by young children. Nature, Lond.
224, 1132 - 1133.
Campbell, R.N, and Young, B.M. (1968) Some aspects of classifactcry
behaviour in pre-school children. (Fresented to the Education
Section of the British Psychological Society).
Donaldson, M. C. (1963) A Study of Children's Thinking. London,
Tavistock.
Donaldson, M.C. and Wales, R.J. (1968) On the acquisition of some
relational terms. In Hayes, J.R. (Ed.) Proceedings of the 1968
Carnegie Symposium on Cognition. New York, Wiley.
Doran/
II.
Doran/ J.E. and Hodson, F.R. (1966) A digital computer analysis of
palaolithicflint assemblages. Nature, Lond. 210, 688 - 689.
Galanter, E.H. (1956) An axiomatic and experimental study of sensory
order and measure. Psychol. Rev. 63, 16 - 28.
Garner, W.R. (1966) To perceive is to know. Amer. Psychologist,
5TTTT - 19.
Gamer, W.R. (1970) The stimulus in information processing. Amer.
Psychologist, 25, 350 - 358.
Garner, W.R. and Morton, J. (1969) Perceptual independence:
Definitions, models and experimental paradigms. Psychol. Bull.
72, 233 - 259.
Ghent, L. (1961) Form and its orientation: a child's-eye view. Amer.
J. Psychol. 74, 177 - 190.
Ghent, L. and Bernstein, L. (1961) Influence of orientation of
geometric forms on their recognition by children. Percept. Mot.
Skills, 12, 95 - 101 *
Gibson, E.J. (1965) Learning to read. Science, 148, 1066 - 1072.
Gibson, E.J. (1969) Principles of Perceptual Learning and Development.
Slew York, Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Gibson, E.J., Gibson, J.J., Pick, A. and Osser,H. (1962) A develop¬
mental study of the discrimination of letter like forms. J. comp.
physiol. Psychol. 55, 897 - 906.
Gibson, E.J., Osser, H., Schiff, W. and Smith, J. (1964). A basic
research program on reading. Final Report on Cooperative
Research Project No. 639 to the Office of Education, Department
of Health, Education and Welfare.
Gibson, J.J. (1966) Jhe Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Boston,
Houghton Mifflin.
Griffiths, J.A., Shantz, C.A. and Sigel, I.A. (1967) A methodological
problem in conservation studies: the use of relational terms.
Child Development, 38, 841 - 848.
Huttenlocher/
III.
Huttenlocher, J. (1967) Discrimination of figure orientation: effects
of relative position. J. comp. physiol. Psychol., 63, 359 - 361.
Handel, S. and Garner, W.R. (1966) The structure of visual pattern
associates and pattern goodness. Perception and Psychophysics,
1, 33 -38.
Imai, S. and Garner, W.R. (1965) Discriminability and preference
for attributes in free and constrained classification. J. exper.
Fsychol., 69, 596 - 608.
Imai, S. and Garner, V/. R. (1968) Structure in perceptual classification.
Psychonomic Monograph Supplements Vol. 2, No. 9 (whole No. 25).
Jeffrey, V/. E. (1966) Discrimination of oblique lines by children.
J. comp. physiol. Fsychol., 62, 154 - 156.
Johnson, S. C. (1967) Hierarchical clustering schemes. Psychometrika,
32, 241 - 254.
Kerpelman, L.C. and Pollack, R. H, (1964) Developmental changes in
the location of form discrimination cues. Percept. Mot. Skills,
19, 375 - 382.
Kruskal, J. B. (1964 a,b) Multidimensional scaling by optimising good-
ness of fit to a non-metric hypothesis. Psychometrika, 29, 1-27
and 115- 129.
Michels, K.M. and Zusne, L. (1965) Metrics of visual form. Psychol.
Bull. 63, ^4 - §6.
Over, R. and Over, J. (1967) Detection and recognition of mirror-
image obliques by young children. J. comp. physiol. Psychol.
64, 467 - 470.
Pick, A, D. (1965) Improvement of visual and tactual form discrimination.
J. exp. Psychol., 69, 331 - 339.
Rosenblith, J. F. (1965) Judgements of simple geometric forms by
children. Percept. Mot. Skills, 21, 947 - 990.
Royer, F.L. and Garner, W.R. (1966) Response uncertainty and perceptual
difficulty of auditory temporal patterns. Perception and Psycho-
physics, 1, 41 - 47
Rudel/
iv.
Rude I, R.G. and Teuber, H.L. (1963) Discrimination of direction
of line in children. J. comp. physio! Psychol., 56, 892 - 898.
Schwartz, J. (1962) The pernicious influence of mathematics on
science. In, Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science,
ed. Nagal, E. Supres, P. and Tarski, A. Stanford.
Sekuler, R.W. and Houlihan, K. (1968) Discrimination of mirror
images: choice time analysis of human adult performance. Quart.
J. exp. Psychol. 20, 204 - 207.
Sekuler, R.W. and Rosenblith, J.F. (1964) Discrimination of direction
of line and thfe effect of stimulus alignment. Psychonom. Sci., 1,
143 - 144.
Shepard, R.N. (1962 a,b) The analysis of proximities: multidimensional
scaling with an unknown distance function. Psychometrika, 27,
125 - 140 and 219 - 246.
Shepard, R.N. (1964) Attention and the metric structure of the stimulus
space. J. math. Psychol., 1, 54 - 87.
Stevens, S. S. (1966) On the operation known as judgement. Amer.
Scientist, 54 . 385 - 401.
Taylor, J.A, and Wales, R.J. (1970) A developmental studyoof form
discrimination in pre-school children. Q.J. exp. Psychol. 22,
720 -734.
Torgerson, W.S. (1965) Multidimensional scaling of similarity. Psycho-
metrika, 30, 379 - 393.
Torgerson, W.S. (1958) Theory and Methods of Scaling. New York, Wiley.
Tversky, A. and Krantz, D. (1969a) The dimensional representation and
the metric structure of similarity data. Michigan Mathematical
Psychology Program, 69-7.
Tversky, A. and Krantz, D. (1969b) Similarity of schematic faces: a test
of interdimensional additivity. Perception and Psychophysics, 5,
124 - 128.
Vurpillot, E. (1968) The development of scanning strategies and their
relation to visual differentiation. J. exp. child Psychol., 6,
622 - 650.
Wohlwill/
Wohlwill, J.F. and Wiener, M. (1964) Discrimination of form
orientation in young children. Child Dev. 35, 1113 - 1125.
Zaporozhets, A. V. (1964) The development of perception in the pre-
school child. In, European Research in Child Development, ed.
Mussen, P. H. Society for Research in £hild Development, Mon.
Vol. 30, serial No. 100.
Q. Jl exp. Psychol. (1970) 22, 720-734.
A DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY OF FORM
DISCRIMINATION IN PRE-SCHOOL
CHILDREN
JOHN A. TAYLOR AND ROGER J. WALES
Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh
Using a matching-from-sample technique the discriminative ability of a group of
pre-school children was tested twice, at mean ages 3-8 and 4-9, in relation to an
independent test of their comprehension of the notion "same". A sequence of
three stages is described, for both shape and orientation discrimination; in the
first, characterized by a large number of errors, the child appears to respond largely
in terms of proximity of a comparison figure to the standard; in the second his
responses reflect gross aspects of similarity between the figures in the comparison
set, in that several matches are made to one standard all of which have certain
attributes in common with it. Finally correct and unique choices are made.
Attributes used in differentiating figures are described, and a number of theoretical
and methodological problems are discussed.
Introduction
Previous work on form discrimination shows that the ability to differentiate between
different forms is well developed in normal children by the age of 5, whether the
stimuli are simple geometric figures (Birch and Lefford, 1967, chapter 4), random
polygons of the Attneave Arnoult type (Brown and Goldstein, 1967), or letters of the
alphabet (Gibson, Osser, Schiff and Smith, 1964). The discrimination of identical
forms in different orientations is a less easy task. Ghent has demonstrated definite
orientation preferences, affecting accuracy of recognition in a matching from
sample situation, in children up to five years old (Ghent, i960; Ghent and Bern¬
stein, 1961; Braine, 1965). Stimulus alignment has been shown to influence
responses in a regular fashion in children (Sekuler and Rosenblith, 1964; Hutten-
locher, 1967a, b), and in adults (Sekuler and Houlihan, 1968). Making due
allowance for this complicating factor (which has been demonstrated only with
pair comparison presentation and may therefore not be generalizable to larger
arrays) it has been generally found that left-right reversals (e.g. b-d) are more
difficult than up-down reversals (e.g. b-p), with 90° rotation and 180° rotation
(e.g. b-q) following in that order (Huttenlocher, 1967a; Rosenblith, 1965; Rubel
and Teuber, 1963; Wohlwill and Weiner, 1964). The last-mentioned authors
also point out that latencies are longer for low-directionality than for high-direct¬
ionality figures, which can be taken as indicating a greater degree of "effort", in
some sense, being required when orientation is not clearly marked. Gibson et al.
(1964) report a similar increase in latencies in the matching of highly confusable
letters.
The well-known series of papers by Eleanor Gibson and her colleagues (Gibson,
Gibson Pick and Osser, 1962; Gibson et al., 1964; Gibson, 1965) presents a more
Reprinted from The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
Vol. XXII, Part 4, November, 1970
FORM DISCRIMINATION IN PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN 721
detailed and larger-scale analysis of a particular aspect of this problem as it appears
n the first stages of learning to read: .. what dimensions of difference must a
child learn to discriminate for each letter to become unique?" (Gibson et al., 1964,
a. 2). In the first paper cited they found that certain transformations of letter-like
:orms were more likely to be confused with the standard form, and that the prob-
ibility of obtaining correct responses with this type of material increased with age.
Specifically, transformations which altered the shape of the comparison figure in
relation to the standard, either by making a gap in a closed figure or by the closure
jf an open one, produced relatively little confusion even in 4-year-old subjects.
There were two types of transformation which preserved the original shape of the
igures; perspective, which essentially produced slight size changes; and rotation
ind reversal, which affected orientation. There was little improvement in ability
:o discriminate the former in subjects up to the age of 8, while errors on the latter
rell steadily to virtually zero by the same age. There are certain apparent discrep-
mcies between the overall findings here and the general ones mentioned above,
vhich Rosenblith (1965) has resolved by a re-analysis of the relevant parts of the
lata.
However, none of these studies takes the child's conception of similarity into
iccount. This is of some importance, since unless his interpretation of the usual form
if instruction "Find a figure in this array which is 'the same as' the standard" is
mown, it is not possible to decide if his errors are due to a genuine failure of
liscrimination or to his not possessing adult criteria of similarity. Garner (1966)
las pointed out that discrimination is a process akin to classification, in which
•esponses are determined more by the properties of sets of stimuli rather than by
hose of individual members of the set. This view implies that we must know to
vhat extent the child's understanding both of the relations expressed by "the same
is", which is the basis of the judgement underlying his discriminative response, and
)f the aspects of the stimulus situation to which he applies it, correspond to those
>f adults. By allowing our subjects to define the subsets of stimulus figures which
hey consider to be equivalent we can see directly what attributes they take to be
elevant in assessing the stimuli, and also infer how widely and how appropriately
hey are applying their notions of similarity.
Our concern here is with the interaction of two aspects of functioning; the
lature of the rules or principles of organization the child has available to him for
:lassifying, and so imposing some order or structure on, his world, and the way in
vhich these are applied to the information that he extracts, in a more or less
idequate manner, from the material presented to him.
There are two possibilities for error in the child's understanding and use of
'same"; either the reference to identity of some kind, the "meaning of the word",
s not known, or, while it is understood to refer to things which are in some sense
dentical the notion of identity does not correspond to adult criteria. From the
esults of a classification test administered to our group of subjects at approximately
he same times as the discrimination task it appears that, with two exceptions which
vill be discussed later, they could respond appropriately when asked to find an
ibject "the same in some way" as one picked out by the experimenter. This test
s described more fully in Campbell and Young (1968), and its linguistic aspects
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discussed by Donaldson and Wales (1968). Thus we can say that errors are no
due to any gross failure of understanding. Our subjects were tested twice; thes
comments apply to them at the time of the first testing, since they were all able t
perform this (classification) task equally well by the time of the second testing.
It should be pointed out that this description of the child's ability to use the notioi
of "same" applies only to the situation where he is asked to find an object o
picture in an arraywhich is "just the same" as some standard object or picture whic'
is separate from the array. The results of another test administered to this sam
group of children at approximately the same time as the classification and discrimin
ation tasks indicate that they do not make correct responses when presented wit]
two pictures pictures side by side and asked if one is the same as the other. Ead
of the pictures was of a string of four beads, presented vertically; one bead on on
string was of a different colour from the corresponding bead on the other string
Stimulus complexity may therefore be an important factor in this apparent discrep
ancy.
In sum, this investigation is concerned with the kinds of stimulus propertie
used by children to discriminate between figures. In addition, we wish to firr
out how the at least rudimentary notion of what is implied by "same" possessed b
our subjects is applied to this type of problem, and how, if at all, its applicatio
changes in terms of the subset of equivalent figures defined by the child, and of th
attributes of stimulation used as a basis for differentiation at different ages.
Method
The three series of stimulus figures shown in Fig. 1 were chosen. Series I, coverin
orientation, represented a set of problems of increasing difficulty as measured by the numbe
of errors made during pilot testing. This was intended as the main index of change betwee
first and second administrations, as we found shape discrimination to be very much simpk
for younger subjects. Series II and III were both intended to provide information o
shape discrimination in relation to both shape and orientation differences, but from distinc
points of view. (Since children in our subjects' age group never, during preliminar
testing, confused rectilinear and curvilinear figures, we did not test this discriminatio
here.) In Series II we attempted to provide as many stimulus attributes as possible, whil
retaining an array of manageable size, to see what kinds of confusions were made whe
figures varied in shape, orientation, number of sides, and in being open or closed. Serif
III represents a more systematic approach to the same question; apart from the two close
figures, which were retained as a further check on Series II findings differ only in orieni
ation and degree of openness. The object here was to see if, given a certain regularity i
stimulus attributes, this would be reflected in responses in any systematic fashion.
For three reasons we decided to use a matching-from sample technique, using fairly larg
arrays, rather than pair comparison, three-choice oddity problems, or matching from sma
samples. The first, the definition by the subjects of those subsets of the total stimulus s(
which they considered to be equivalent, has already been discussed. This is relatec
second, to the way in which "same" is understood; it is much easier to test the limits of th
notion by direct observation of the groups of figures the child describes as being the sarr
than to infer them from single responses to stimulus pairs or triplets. Finally, there is th
mechanical problem of number of stimulus presentations; we wanted to study form an
orientation discrimination separately and also to see what happened when both form an
orientation differences were combined in the one array, and so had to use an economic;
method of gathering data. A further consideration arose during pilot testing of our materia
part of which involved pair comparison presentation. We found here, particularly wit
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Figure i. Experimental material. In Series I standards are shown by St; numbers shown with
figures in problems 3 and 4 give the order of layout of the comparison array on second present¬
ation. Numbers in Series II and III are figure labels.
figures differing only in orientation, that the child tended to label the figure and make his
judgement in terms of the label (the question asked was, "Is this picture just the same as this
one?" accompanied by appropriate pointing by E). For example, when faced with two
ellipses in different orientations a typical response to this question would be, "That's an
egg and that's an egg" or "Both eggs", rather than a direct "yes" or "no". Although this
labelling also occured with the larger arrays finally used in the experiment proper, particular¬
ly with the younger children, it was much easier to get the child to accept that there was one
that was the same as the standard.
Subjects
These comprised the 24 children participating in an intensive longitudinal study of
cognitive and linguistic development in pre-school children. They were tested twice, at
mean age 3 years 8 months (range 3-4 to 4-0) and 4 years 9 months. The earlier sample
included one child who was not available for later testing. Thus there were 13 male and
11 female subjects at the time of first testing, and 23, the same group less one boy, at the
second. The two testing sessions will hereafter be referred to as pretest and post-test,
respectively.
Presentation
The three series of figures were drawn in black ink on 3-in2 white cards, which were
covered with washable plastic. During each testing session the experimenter and subject
sat at a small table, appropriate to the size of the Subject, with the experimenter on the
subjects' right. Series I problems were presented one at a time, the experimenter laying
j. a. taylor and r. j. wales
out the comparison array as shown in Fig. i with a duplicate of the standard just below the
centre of the array. The experimenter pointed to the standard, told the subject to have a
good look at it, then said, "See if you can find a picture up here that's just the same as this
one", running his finger slowly the length of the line of comparison figures while doing so,
and pointing again at the standard at the words ". . . this one". Three different problems
were used to introduce the task; with these, errors were explained and correct matches
indicated. This was not done with any of the experimental material; the experimenter
made general approving comments, such as ,"Good, that's the way", whatever the response,
irregularly throughout each session. The arrays for Series II and III were laid out as
shown in Fig. i, duplicate copies of the standard being placed in the gap in the bottom
row. Instructions were as for Series I, with no introductory examples and no correction of
errors. Order of presentation of the standards was the same for all subjects, but bore no
relation to the order of figures in the array. The three series were presented in the order of
their numbering, problems 3 and 4 of Series I being presented again after Series III, with
the comparison cards laid out in the alternative order shown.
Questions of attention, interest, and general willingness to perform are of central concern
in any investigation with children of this age. All our subjects were quite happy to "come
and play games" or "do some puzzles". Time for a full session varied from 15 to 20 min.,
depending on the amount of time taken up by irrelevancies between problems, but care was
taken to ensure that subjects attended to each problem as it was presented.
Results
We shall first present an analysis of the results for each series individually, and
then give an overview of our subjects' performance over the three parts of the
experiment.
Series I
The results for this series are shown in Tables I and II. Two subjects in the
pre-test gave card 1 as the match to the standard in all problems; their results are
omitted from Table I. Where the number of first choices shown is less than the
number of subjects, this indicates that one or more of the subjects matched all
Table I
Series I pre-test matches
Card Problem
Position 1 2 3 3R 4 4R 5
I 15 13 6 S 5 2 7 S 1 O 6 3 JO 8
2 1 1 7 4 4 3 4 1 6 5 1 0 2 1
3 6 6 4 2 10 7 5 5 3 2 2 2 8 7
4 2 1 10 7 6 2 8 8 13 11 15 13 6 5
S 1 0 3 0 6 3 2 1 8 3 5 3 —
-
6 2 1 7 3 8 5 2 1 5 1 4 1 — -
2
responses 27 22 37 21 39 22 28 21 36 22 33 22 26 22
■Umax °'39t 0-42! 0-06 o-ig o-io o-n 0-19 0-24 0-22 0-18 0-23 o-37 0-14 0-13
Number of first responses to each problem is given in right-hand columns; total number of
responses in left-hand columns. Standards are italicized. Umax values are from Kolmogorov-
Smirnov one-sample test.
N— 22; total correct first responses=45.
f P o-oi; S total responses = 226.
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Table II
Series I post-test matches
Card
Position I 2 3
Problem
3R 4 4r 5
1 22 22 3 1 7 2 4 2 2 O 5 1 *4 12
2 I I 14 11 2 1 11 5 IO 4 2 0 1 3
3 I O 7 5 9 4 15 8 3 1 1 0 9 4
4 O O 6 4 7 5 9 6 14 12 20 I9 4 1
5 O O 2 0 14 6 2 0 15 5 10 2 — —
6 I O 3 2 2 4 8 1 8 0 4 0
— -
2
responses 25 23 35 23 51 22 49 22 52 22 42 22 34 20
-Dmax 0'7if °'79t o-is 0-25 0-18 0-20 0-13 o-29t 0*2I 0-27 o*3if 0-46+ o*i6 °'35
Number of first responses to each problem is given in right-hand columns, total number of
responses in left-hand columns. Standards are italicized. Dmax ,values are from Kolmogorov-
Smirnov one-sample test.
N— 22; total correct first responses= 45.
f P < o-oi; J P < 0-05; 2 total responses= 286.
the comparison cards, unshakably, to the standard, without singling out any one
as a preferred choice even after questioning.
Improvement over time is shown by the increased number of correct first
choices in the post test as compared with the pre-test; 8 subjects failed to repeat
their previous success on the same post-test items, but none of these got more than
one of the problems correctly answered in the pre-test wrong in the post-test. A
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test shows the difference to be highly signifi¬
cant (N = 20; T = 32-5,; P< 0-005 (one-tailed)). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
■Dmax values shown also demonstrate this improvement, in terms of an altered
distribution of responses; three of the 14 distributions are significantly different from
chance in the pre-test, while 6 are in the post-test Greater success occurs with
problems 1 and 2, where orientation of the figures is more clearly marked than in
any other problem. The large number of correct responses in the repeat of problem
4 is unexpected, but the artificial nature of this result is clear from Table III, which
shows the presence of a strong positioned bias. This is done by comparing the
number ofwrong choices of a figure in a particular position in the array, as a match
to the standard, with the total number of times a choice of a figure in that position
would have been correct. The numbers in Table III refer to the number of
choices of a figure in a given position, totalled over all problems except 5. The
order of preference is the same, although in different degrees, for both pre- and
post-test; a figure in position 4 is most likely to be chosen, followed by one, in
position 3, 1, and 6, in that order.
Series II
A multidimensional scaling analysis was carried out on the results from Series II
and III. The object of this technique is to find a spatial configuration, in as few
dimensions as possible, in which the judged similarity of the members of a set of
stimulus objects is reflected in their proximity in the plot. In this case, the more
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Table III
Card position 1 2 3 4 5 6
Possible correct choices 22 .42 0 22 44 0
Pre-test Total choices 28 14 24 42 10 12
Wrong choices IS 9 24 29 4 12
Possible correct choices 23 45 0 22 44 0
Post-test Total choices 3° 22 18 46 IS 7
Wrong choices 8 6 18 27 4 7
Number of first choice matches in Series I given to figures in each position in relation to available
correct matches totalled over all problems except 5. Discrepancies between possible correct choices
reflect omission of two subjects from the pre-test, and of those subjects giving "all" responses.
similar two figures are seen to be, that is the more often they are confused, the
closer together theywill be in thefinal configuration. The method is fully described
by Shepherd (1962#, b) and by Kruskal (1964a, 6); the particular version used here
was developed by J. Doran (Doran and Hobson, 1966).
Performance in Series II was good in the pretest and improved considerably in
the post-test, as shown by the increased number of correct responses, the drop in
total of responses, and the small number of confusions (Table IV). The difference
between the number of correct responses is again highly significant by the Wilcoxon
test (N =16; T = 2-5; P < 0-005 (one-tailed)). The scaling configurations, in
two dimensions for both pre- and post-test, are shown in Figure 2. The three pairs
of figures in different orientations are very closely related to each other. There is
a clear separation between open and closed figures, and, within the former group,
between three- and four-sided ones. In the post-test these distinctions are more
definite than they may appear from the plot, in view of the minimal number of
confusions made between figures in these groups. The two "unique" figures, 5
and 8, have the highest percentage of correct responses in both sessions; the cor¬
responding results for the other figures reflect the extent to which the two exemplars
of each in different orientations are taken as similar. Figure 8 was matched to all














Figure 2. Pre- (®) and post-test (x) configurations, Series II. Delta = 0-004 ar"d 0-0006
respectively. The axes merely provide a frame of reference and consequently are unlabelled.
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preference effect similar to that already noted in Series I. It is difficult to account
for its popularity in other terms.
The kinds of features used in making these judgements may be seen in Table IV,
which also gives total number of matches and correct matches to each figure. In
the post-test only figure 8 is matched to, or has matched to it, a non-identical
figure differing in orientation. Several subjects made comments such as, "That's
a wee bit the same" or "That's the same but bigger" when comparing 2 and 8,
thus demonstrating that they could differentiate the two while being uncertain
whether they should call them "the same". In the pre-test, ifwe take the choice of
8 as being due to some positional artifact, the only confusions between open and
closed figures are the choice of 3 as a match to 4, which was only given by subjects
who had already given either 2 or 1 as a match to 4, which was only given by
Table IV
Principal matches, total matches and correct matches on Series II
Standard Pre-test Post-test
Total Correct Total Correct
matches matches matches matches
1 1 (40) 4 (3i) 2 (n) 35 14 1 (61) 4 (39) 3i 19
2 2(48) 8(19) 7 (16) 31 15 2 (69) 7 (22) 32 22
3 3 (46) 6 (17) 8(11) 35 16 3 (76) 6 (17) 29 22
4 4(48) 1 (25) 3(8) 40 19 4 (75) 1 (21) 28 21
5 5(58) 8(13) 3 (10) 31 18 5 (92) - 25 23
6 6 (55) 3 (14) 1 (10) 29 16 6(69) 3 (31) 29 20
7 7 (46) 2 (24) 8(11) 37 17 7 (82) 2 (18) 27 22
8 8 (7°) 1 (10) 2 (7) 30 21 8 (88) 2(8) 25 22
Total 268 136 Total 226 171
Bracketed numbers are percentages of total matches made to a given standard; numbers before
brackets refer to figures.
subjects who had already given either 2 or 1 as a match to 4, and or 1, 4 and 2 as a
match to 6. There seems to be some whole-part effect here, and also in the match¬
ing of 1 to 2 and 8, and of 7 to 4, but too much should not be made of this since
any one of our sets of figures can be described in terms of parts common to the
whole set with the possible exception of 5. Orientation as a distinguishing
criterion is to a large extent ignored in both pre- and post-tests.
One surprising feature of these results was theasymmetric nature of both matrices.
The major asymmetries are shown in Table V, omitting those in which figure 8
occurs. Two factors must be taken into account here; the degree to which the
standard figure is seen as unique, and the number of other figures which are seen as
similar to it. Both of these will determine how many "spare" judgements, so to
speak, will be available for this kind of effect. Nevertheless, this does show the
influence of context in a rather striking way; degree of judged similarity will reflect
not some absolute relation between two figures, but the way in which that relation
is perceived against the background of the total stimulus set.




1 (31) — (25) 4 1 (38) — (21) 4
2 (16) — (24) 7 2 (21) — (18) 7
3 (13) — (i7) 6 3 (17) — (31) 6
1 (0) — (10) 6
A(X) — (Y)B: A is matched to'B, Y times; B is matched to A, X times. X and Y numbers are
percentages.
Finally, let us consider the two subjects mentioned earlier, whose use of "same"
was different from that of the rest of the group. For one, "same in some way"
meant identical in all respects, from his classification performance; he made no
errors, of either confusion or omission, on this series. For the other it meant non-
identical ; she got every item wrong, apparently following a rule of her own, if you
can't find a figure which is part of the standard then find one ofwhich the standard
is a part. Her matches were (standards first); 1=2; 2=153 = 554 = 2,3,7;
5 = 356 = 457=4 ;8 = 1,2. Both, however, failed to follow their own rules in
the other two pre-test series.
Series III
Overall performance here is not so good as in Series II, in that more confusions
are made in both pre- and post-tests. Improvement over time is not so obvious,
but is nevertheless demonstrated on the same criteria as used for the previous series.
The Wilcoxon test gives N = 20, T = 14, P < 0-005 (one-tailed). Three-
dimensional configurations were required for both sets of results; these are shown
in Figure 3. The two closed figures, 3 and 6, are well separated from the rest in
both plots, again demonstrating the lack of confusability between open and closed
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Table VI
Principal matches, total matches and correct matches on Series III























































figures. In the pre-test, of the remaining six figures, 1, 2, and 4, with gaps upper¬
most, project in the opposite direction to figures 5, 7 and 8, with gaps at the side.
Degree of openness is reflected in the relative proximity of 2 and 7, at least open,
and 1 and 8, most open; 4 and 5 are much more widely separated, and seem to
indicate an area of uncertainty over the appropriate criteria to be used in matching.
These are the most difficult items, with fewer correct responses than any other.
The criterion for matching seems to switch from a roughly equivalent emphasis
on shape and orientation in the pre-test to shape only in the post-test. Figure 3
shows 3 and 6 again to be rarely confused with the open figures. 2 and 7, 5 and 4,
and 1 and 8, are clustered in pairs projecting in the same direction. Thus orient¬
ation is largely ignored as a determinant of similarity, with matches being made on
the basis of degree of openness. Table VI shows this very clearly. Responses
are not so widely distributed in the post-test, and the order of choice is, with the
exception of 5, systematic in a way which is not the case for the pre-test, reflecting
the greater likelihood of figures of the same "shape" but different orientation being
judged to be the same as the standard.
Asymmetries here are more marked than in Series II (Table VII). With the
exception of those between figures 5 and 8, in both sessions, they all obtain between
figures opposed in orientation. It is not immediately apparent how this finding
should be interpreted. It may be related to the way in which the two attributes
of shape and orientation are used in judging the figures. From Table VIII we can
see that an equivalent mean percentage of mismatches are made between figures
which differ only in their orientation in both pre- and post-tests, but that the number
Table VII
Series III asymmetries (format as for Table V)
Pre-test Post-test
1 (17) — (3) 5 1 (11) — (°) 5
1 (39) — (is) 8 1 (27) — (11) 8
2 (25) — (14) 7 2 (10) — (22) 7
5 (19) — (0)8 s (22) — (11) 8
4 (19) — (°) 8
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Table VIII
Mean percentage errors on Series III as a function of number of attributes
differentiating stimulus figures
Degree of difference between Standard and Comparison figures
One attribute Two
Orientation Shape Combined attributes
Pre-test 18 11 13-3 6-7
Post-test 18-3 75 ii-i i-8
of confusions between figures differing only in shape and in both shape and orient¬
ation drops in the post-test. (Results for figures 3 and 6 have been omitted here.)
This demonstrates an increasing refinement of discriminative ability with age;
although errors are not eliminated, responses do reflect some appreciation of the
aspects of similarity holding between the stimulus figures.
In terms of the proportions of correct responses, the order of difficulty of the
three series is II, III, I, in both pre- and post-tests. This is to be expected, in
viewof the relatively greater difficultyof orientation comparedwithshape discrimin¬
ation and of the fact that more criteria for differentiation are available in Series II
than in Series III. What is not expected is the disparity in total numbers of
responses; while these decrease for Series II and III between pre- and post-test,
they increase for Series I. This increase, which is particularly noticeable in
problems 3 and 4 and their repeats, appears to be linked to a change in distribution
of responses which takes account of more global features of similarity such as
obliquity. In problem 3, the figure in position 2 (position 5 in problem 3R), the
only "vertical" figure in anotherwise "horizontal" array, is chosen 4 times out of a
total for the two problems of 98 matches, and in problem 4, figures in positions 1
and 3 (3 and 2 respectively in 4R), the two non-oblique figures in the array, are
picked 4 times out of 94 matches. The standards in these cases corresponded to
the more often chosen class of comparison figures. These observations led us to
hypothesize three stages in the development of form discrimination. The first
stage, that of non-competence, would be characterized by a large number of errors
and a small number ofmultiple responses (MRs), where more than one comparison
figure is matched to the standard. This would be succeeded by an intermediate
stage when the child has a clearer idea of what is required of him, but is not yet
fully able to make the requisite unique match. Here we would expect to find
fewer errors, and a concomitant increase in MRs; we would also expect to find that
the figures given in the MRs would be more closely related to each other, in some
at least intuitively reasonable manner, than to the remainder of the choice set.
Finally, when a clear notion of the correct match is available we expect a large pro¬
portion of correct responses and very few MRs.
The appearance of this sequence, assuming it to be a valid representation of
discrimination performance, will clearly be subject to individual differences in
both subjects and problems; the level of responding will vary from child to child
form discrimination in pre-school children 731
and from problem to problem. Nevertheless, we would expect increased success
over the stages outlined above over time, with little if any regression to lower levels
either with simpler problems at any one time, or with the same problems over time.
That this very largely holds true for our experiment can be seen from Table IX.
The second stage has been split to accommodate different types of performance
which could not be assigned either to the first or third stages. The (arbitrary)
criteria used to categorise our subjects are (first figures percentage MR, bracketed
figures number of correct matches):
(A) <25 (<25)
(B) (i) < 25 (> 25 < 75)
(ii) >25 < 75 (>25 <75)
(iii) > 25 (< 75)
(C) <25 (>75)
The sequence holds up reasonably well. Variations in individual performance
and improvement are wide. Five subjects in Series I, 2 in Series II, and 1 in
Series III show a poorer performance on the post-test than the pre-test, by these
criteria; of these 8, 4 move from one stage to another, the rest staying within (B)
but in a lower sub-division.
The relationship between choices based on position preference, as described for
Series I, and figural similarity, remains to be clarified. If the sequence described
above, particularly the intermediate stage, is to be accepted as valid, then we must
show that responses by subjects classified at this level do reflect the latter rather
than the former. We have already described the distribution of response to
problems 3 and 4 and their repeats in terms of a tendency to ignore those comparison
Table IX
Classification of subjects as a function of their level ofperformance on all three
series in pre-• and post-tests
Stage Series I II III
Pre 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 8, 13, 15, 20 8, 13, 15, 20
(A) Post 14, 15, 20, 21, 22
Post 16,18,21 - -
Pre 4, 6, 17, 18, 23 7, 12, 18, 21, 22, 23 7, 12, 18, 19, 21,
(i) 21, 22, 23
Post 3. 4, 13. i4» 17 14, 16, 18, 21 6, 14, 16, 18, 21, 22
(B) (ii) Pre 1, 10, 11, 16, 19 14 4, 14, 16, 17
Post 6, 7, 8, 15, 19,
20, 21, 23 — -
(iii) Pre 2, 3 3. 4. 10. 16 I, IO, II
Post 10, 11, 12 S, 7, 8, 11, is, 20 7, 8, 11, 15, 20
(C) Pre - 1, 2, s, 6, 9, 17, 19 2, 3, 5, 6, 9
Post 1, 2, s, 9 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 1°,
13, 17, 19, 22, 23 12, 13, 17, 19, 23
Numbers refer to children, assignment being arbitrary.
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figures which are intuitively less closely related to the standard than are the rest of
the array. In problens 4 and 4R one of these figures was always in position 3,
the second most commonly chosen position in both the pre- and post-test. Table
X shows the number of responses to these "obvious mismatch" (OM) figures in
relation to the total number of matches given by subjects at stages B(ii) and B(iii)
making MRs in these four problems. It is clear that these subjects are using
criteria of global similarity in making their judgments, and that if position preference
is operating it is certainly not dominant.
Table X
Influence ofgross features of similarily on the responses of subjects in categories
B(ii) and B(iii)
No. subjects Total responses No. "all" Position No. responses
making MRs (less "all") responses of OM to OM
p
r
0 3 17 43 2 2 1
b 3r 13 3° 2 5 2
1 4 i4 34 3 i,3 1
e 4r 10 28 1 3, 2 2
m
Discussion
The results of Series II and III show that even at three-and-a-half children are
capable of discriminating between figures with considerable success, and that there
are quite distinct class boundaries to the confusion errors which they do make.
The shape of a figure, and whether or not it is open or closed, appear to be more
often used than number of sides or orientation as criteria for differentiation. The
number of attributes defining the difference between figures is also of importance,
in that fewer confusions are made when there are two rather than one distinguishing
features present; this is to be expected, inasmuch as there is a greater chance that
the difference between two figures will be noticed. However, it is very probable
that with a "messy" set of stimuli, such as that used in Series II, the counting of
attributes becomes irrelevant (to the experimenter in his attempts to formalise
what his subjects are doing) since some must be given a heavier weighing than others
and because of the way in which attributes become inextricably confounded even
in comparatively simple geometric figures. In both series the emphasis on shape
at the older age, with orientation being very much less used as a determinant of
similarity, suggests that whereas orientation can be used as a basis for judgement
(from the information gained from Series I), where there is a more obvious criterion
of differentiation, which shape may be inferred to be from the greater ease with
which such problems are handled, that alone will be used; the child has no difficult¬
ies over the combination of attributes, because he is not allowing them equal
weight. It may not be coincidental that it is also at this age that children tend to
fail in the Piagetian conservation of liquid task through their inability to appreciate
the interaction between two aspects of the situation, to realize that increased
height is compensated for by decreased width.
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As for orientation discrimination, once the child has passed the first stage in the
developmental sequence outlined above, his responses are going to reflect, if not
identity with the standard, at least some systematic relation of similarity between
it and his choices. To this extent our results contradict a suggestion by Gibson
et al. (1962), to the effect that transformation type is a better predictor of errors than
the nature of the stimulus. Our findings are more in accord with Rosenblith's
(1965) comment that figures may "behave" differently under similar transform¬
ations, that different error patterns may be obtained depending on the standards
and the choice set available; it appears that the relationship between the features of
the standards and of the members of the comparison arraywill largely determine the
type of matches made, thus reflecting the importance of context in perceptual
judgements.
In many ways the sequence of stages in the development of form discrimination
which has been inferred from our results is the most interesting aspect of this study.
The transition from the first to the second stage is analogous to a phenomenon
noted, in a different context, by Donaldson (1963), an increase in response error
following the partial development of new abilities in the child; opportunities for
mistakes increase following the realization that more factors than had hitherto
been considered must be taken into account, while the capacity to cope with these
additional aspects of the situation is still under-developed. The problem here is
in knowing what the developing abilities are. In the present context one of these
would appear to be how similarity is understood and expressed. In the first
stage a child who has an at least partially correct notion of what "same" means
seems to be unable to apply it in any systematic fashion; matches to the standards
are based more on proximity to it than on any other factor (witness the position
effects, particularly in the pre-test, in Series, and the very large number of matches
to figure 8 in both Series II and III). This is an effect which has also been noticed
by Bijou and Baer (1963). Then in the second stage the child does start respond¬
ing on the basis of similarity between stimulus figures, but without differentiating
sufficiently between them to produce the correct matches of the final stage. How¬
ever, there is a strong interaction effect, in that the level of responding appears to be
at least partly a function of stimulus complexity. For example, in problems 1 and
2 of Series I the total number of responses dropped slightly in the post-test as
compared with the pre-test, whereas it increased considerably for the rest of the
problems. Given these findings, it seems reasonable to suggest that the greater
number of errors children make in pair comparison situations is an artefact of the
experimental set-up; there is no room here for partial success, so that unless the
child has reached the third of the three stages described here he will be recorded as
having "failed to make the discrimination".
A final implication of this experiment for the study of the development of form
discrimination appears to us to be the importance of taking a relational point of
view rather than an absolute one. The child's comprehension of the instructions,
of the terms in which he is to compare the figures, should be independently checked
and it is to be expected that the errors made will be a function not simply of the
features of the stimuli taken in isolation but of the relationship between those of
the standard and of the comparison figures. It then becomes more practicable to
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consider systematically changes in the use of contextually defined stimulus inform¬
ation as the child develops.
We should like o thank our many colleagues for helpful comments and the S.S.R.C.
for research support.
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